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Abstract
Network economic analysis provides an important and intuitive explanation of racial inequality. In short,
Whiteness is Microsoft's Windows operating system, or the QWERTY keyboard, or the standard (non-
metric) measurement system, and difficult to dislodge for many of the same reasons. Network effects explain
how the establishment of a dominant market standard 1) can be contingent on historical context, 2) does not
necessarily derive from superior intrinsic merit, and 3) exhibits strong self-reinforcing characteristics that can
maintain the dominance of the standard in perpetuity, even in the absence of any explicit or conscious
determination to maintain it. All of these factors are present with regard to the economic and cultural
dominance of Whiteness in the United States. Whiteness works like a network standard in three important
ways: 1) increasing returns to scale arising from communication standards drive markets toward a single
dominant racial standard; 2) various kinds of positive feedback in complementary markets make the
dominance of the Whiteness standard sticky, or resistant to change; and 3) the establishment of Whiteness as
the dominant racial standard is due to historical events rather than to any inherent or natural qualities. This
insight casts new light on mainstream explanations of racial inequality, supporting the critique that: 1) current
racial inequality is not the result of unequal merit, but is the legacy of history; and 2) no racist intent or
conspiracy is required for this inequality to continue - rather, specific intent and determination is required to
dislodge it.
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Essay I demonstrate that a network economic analysis of race 
provides an important and intuitive explanation of racial inequality.  In 
short, Whiteness1 is Microsoft’s Windows operating system, or the 
QWERTY keyboard, or the standard (non-metric) measurement system, 
and it is difficult to dislodge for many of the same reasons.  Network 
effects explain how (1) the establishment of a dominant market standard 
can be contingent on historical context, and it is not necessarily derived 
from superior intrinsic merit, and (2) a dominant standard exhibits strong 
self-reinforcing characteristics that can maintain the dominance of the 
standard in perpetuity, even in the absence of any explicit or conscious 
determination to maintain it.  All of these factors are present with regard to 
the economic and cultural dominance of Whiteness in the United States.  
This insight casts new light on mainstream explanations of racial 
inequality, supporting the critique that (1) current racial inequality is not 
the result of unequal “merit,” but is the legacy of history, and (2) no racist 
intent or conspiracy is required for this inequality to continue.  Rather, 
specific intent and determination is required to dislodge it. 
We live in an age of liberal economic thought.  Not only have the 
totalitarian socialist countries either fallen or made significant concessions 
to the power of free markets, but the country most devoted to individualism 
and free-market capitalism, the United States, remains standing as the only 
remaining superpower.2  The dominant narrative of modern history seems 
clear:  free markets won. 
Moreover, we recently experienced the longest, strongest, unbroken 
period of economic growth in modern history, and although parts of the 
economy are weaker than others, the current recession has been relatively 
mild.3  Americans are to be forgiven, then, for imagining that these 
immutable lessons of history are simply to be absorbed.  For example, the 
title of Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of History and the Last Man,4 is 
                                                          
 1. I capitalize “White” and “Whiteness” throughout, on the premise that these terms 
are not natural, objective descriptions of a biological characteristic but instead represent a 
socially and culturally constructed identity category, much like religious or national 
affiliations, and therefore should be capitalized.  See discussion infra notes 142-47.  
 2. See SAMIR AMIN, OBSOLESCENT CAPITALISM:  CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF GLOBAL 
DISORDER 81 (2003) (discussing President Bush’s declaration that the United States is the 
only remaining superpower that is willing to create a “new international order”). 
 3. See President Bill Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union (2000) (“We begin the new century with over twenty million new jobs; 
the fastest economic growth in more than thirty years; the lowest unemployment rates in 
thirty years; the lowest poverty rates in twenty years; the lowest African American and 
Hispanic unemployment rates on record; the first back-to-back surpluses in forty-two years; 
and next month, American will achieve the longest period of economic growth in our entire 
history.”). 
 4. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xii-xiii (1993). 
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meant to suggest that humanity has discovered the appropriate political 
ideology for perpetual self-governance and social order.5  Free-market 
liberal democracies are the answer.6  While there might still be subsidiary 
social issues to address and fine-tuning to do, the basic debate is over.  We 
no longer need to entertain serious ideological debate regarding the 
fundamental structure of government.  Resistance is futile. 
On the ground, the effects of this kind of thinking are palpable. The 
wealth and income gaps between the very rich and the rest of the world 
grows unabated7 and unabashedly.8  Both the winners and the losers accept 
the uneven distribution of goods as being their just desserts.9  After all, the 
impartial market is presumed to weigh the relative merits without regard to 
status or historical context and determine the outcome.  We reserve our 
disdain for those who presume to advocate government intervention in the 
market and unfairly seek special, unearned privileges or advantages for 
themselves.10 
For those who seek racial justice, the intellectual and cultural hegemony 
of this kind of economic thinking is not a welcome development.11  
According to neoclassical economic doctrine, (1) government need only 
prevent the exercise of the lingering vestiges of irrational racism, although 
even this might unnecessarily impede the self-correcting features of the 
                                                          
 5. See Sherman A. Jackson, Shari’Ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State:  
Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 88, 89 n.5 
(2003) (stating that in The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama suggests that 
“Western Capitalism and democracy have now emerged as the final form” of human 
democracy). 
 6. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at xii-xiv (believing that humanity will ultimately 
practice liberal democracy and stating, “[L]iberal principles in economics—the ‘free 
market’—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material 
prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the 
close of World War II, part of the impoverished”). 
 7. See, e.g., MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE 
WEALTH:  A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 29 (1995) (stating that in the United 
States twenty percent of the population earns forty-three percent of all income while the 
poorest one-fifth earn four percent of the total income). 
 8. See, e.g., DINESH D’SOUZA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY 64-69 (2000) (discussing 
economist Edward Wolff’s assertion that eighty-five percent of the nation’s wealth increase 
between 1983 and 2000 went to the top one percent of wealth individuals, and the remaining 
fifteen percent of new wealth went to the next nine percent of wealth holders). 
 9. See Kurt Finsterbusch, The Social Impact of Scarcity, in THE COMING AGE OF 
SCARCITY:  PREVENTING MASS DEATH AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 144, 
154 (Michael N. Dobkowski & Isidor Walliman eds., 1998) (stating that even losers support 
the system because they hope to eventually win and gain something from economic growth). 
 10. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 
156 (1994) (discussing rent-seeking by racial groups, which “refers to efforts of people to 
secure laws that convey monopoly power and profits upon themselves”). 
 11. See Richard Delgado, The Tales of White Folk:  Doctrine, Narrative, and the 
Reconstruction of Racial Reality, The Rodrigo Chronicles:  Conversations about America 
and Race, 84 CAL. L. REV. 377, 408-09 (1996) (arguing that legal economists do not 
appreciate the role of racial bias in shaping market forces, and noting that critical race 
theorists do not have as much faith that the market will eliminate racism). 
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market;12 and (2) any remaining racial disparities are either fading 
historical vestiges or fair, color-blind results.13  Under this paradigm, 
affirmative action is seen as an unjust or even racist intervention in the 
market,14 which hurts everyone, including the supposed beneficiaries.  This 
view has become so widespread and conventional that I have observed 
many White law students confronted with a defense of affirmative action 
respond not with resistance, but with pity, bolstered by a well-founded 
confidence that affirmative action will not long be a significant threat to 
them in the real world.15  The recent claims by African Americans for 
reparations for slavery are met with hostility and similar dismissal:  what 
possible relevance could historical slavery have on the failure of minorities 
to thrive in today’s merit-based marketplace?16 
Critical Race Theorists in particular have identified traditional economic 
analysis, and the methodological individualism that underlies classical 
economic theory, as the enemy.  “Race crits” have deployed persuasive and 
empathy-provoking personal narratives,17 detailed factual historical 
research,18 and sophisticated theoretical analysis19 to delineate systems, 
                                                          
 12. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 29-31 (1992) (“Freedom of contract is the position that results when 
the employment discrimination laws are removed, and it yields vastly different results from 
the removal of all legal restraints on aggressive action.”). 
 13. Id. at 139 (arguing that perfect competition eliminates discrimination). 
 14. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 156 (stating that formal laws actually sustain 
discriminatory norms because these laws interfere with the market forces’ ability to 
“disintegrate” discrimination). 
 15. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309-10 (2003) (expressing the 
expectation that affirmative action will no longer be necessary in twenty-five years).  See 
also, e.g., Robert J. Bliwise, Reaffirming Affirmative Action—From Courtroom to 
Classroom, Duke Mag., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu 
/dukemag/issues/091003/action1.html (quoting white Duke student Jonathan Bigelow’s 
comment, “I have not observed any explicit resentment from white students on campus . . . 
And Duke students probably have little to gripe about from a personal perspective, since we 
were all admitted.”). 
 16. See, e.g., David Boyle, Unsavory White Omissions:  A Review of Uncivil Wars, 105 
W. VA. L. REV. 655, 657 (2003) (disagreeing with David Horowitz’s book entitled, Uncivil 
Wars:  The Controversy over Reparations for Slavery, which argues that paying reparations 
to descendants of former slaves is unnecessary and burdensome on taxpayers who never 
owned slaves, and arguing that Horowitz ignores the unsavory omissions of Whites in the 
area of African-American justice). 
 17. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (detailing the history of racial oppression through various fables); 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (using an 
autobiographical essay to depict the author’s struggle with race, gender, and class). 
 18. See generally MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002) (analyzing how United States foreign policy efforts abroad 
were impacted by the American Civil Rights Movement because, as the United States 
claimed to be the human rights leader in the world, it received scrutiny from other countries, 
including communist regimes). 
 19. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiii-
xiv (1996) (arguing that Whiteness is changeable and ultimately social, based on an analysis 
of various cases in which state and federal courts developed the concept of Whiteness). 
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cultures, and ideologies of racial oppression that persist, and that demand a 
modern remedy.  Yet a simple and powerful foundational economic 
premise—that individuals make independent, self-interested decisions20 
that distribute benefits efficiently according to the collective valuation of 
market actors21—works together with a virtuous, conscious determination 
to foreswear irrational, intentional, racial discrimination to produce a blunt 
counter to all of the persuasive power that race crits can muster:  “We’re 
not racists and we don’t discriminate, so any unequal conditions reflect the 
impartial judgment of the market. Theorizing about racial oppression is a 
distraction, and counterproductive to true equality.”22 
There is, however, something new on the economic front.  We are 
moving into an information economy, we are told, which has different 
economic rules.23  Strikingly, the new “network economics,” which is 
driving the creation of vast new fortunes and industries, breaks some of the 
standard economic assumptions we have learned to profess.24  Economists 
have noticed that in such a market, fair competition based on traditional 
understandings of merit does not always occur.25 
A brief and familiar example will illustrate the point. Microsoft’s 
Windows has become the undisputed dominant product in the market for 
personal computer operating systems.26  The claim of network economics is 
that this is not, or at least not necessarily, because Windows is the best 
operating system around. Instead, Microsoft dominates because:  (1) the 
more people there are who own Windows, the more attractive it is for 
others to own it;27 (2) the more Windows users there are, the more likely it 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS  85-86 (17th 
ed. 2001) (discussing the theory of demand and utility, where consumers make decisions 
based on personal satisfaction and other rational consumer behavior). 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing dominance in market economies, where consumers 
ultimately determine, through market forces, where resources are channeled). 
 22. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 298-
99 (1990) (arguing against the general notion that society does not discriminate and instead 
stating that the presence and power of unconscious racism is embedded in every aspect of 
society). 
 23. See KEVIN KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY:  10 RADICAL STRATEGIES 
FOR A CONNECTED WORLD 1 (1998) (noting that the emerging new economic order has “its 
own distinct opportunities and pitfalls . . . those who play by the new rules will prosper, 
while those who ignore them will not”). 
 24. See id. at 94 (explaining the argument that with expanding networks and 
technological advancement, distance, place, real estate, and geography are no longer 
relevant). 
 25. See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by 
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989) (finding that the market sometimes adopts 
inferior technologies as increasing-return technologies compete in the market system). 
 26. See KELLY, supra note 23, at 4 (stating that Microsoft is now the role model for the 
new economy, and recognizing that it is the “highest-valued company” in the world). 
 27. See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry:  A Market Lock-in Model of 
Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 732-33 (2000) (noting that as more programs become 
compatible with Microsoft, future users are more likely to use Windows because they prefer 
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is that more software applications will be offered by other firms that run on 
Windows;28 (3) the more firms there are that use Windows, the more useful 
it becomes to learn Windows skills;29 (4) the more people there are in the 
world using Windows, the more useful it is to operate a system with disks, 
protocols, and file formats that are compatible with Windows;30 and (5) the 
more Windows applications, Windows-trained personnel, and Windows-
compatible systems there are in the world, the more inexorable the 
conclusion that one must own a computer system that runs on Windows, 
even if you think it is an impossibly buggy and sluggish system.  Network 
economics makes Windows an indispensable product.31 
In markets that exhibit network economic effects, there is no single 
equilibrium regarding valuable products that the market will settle on.32  
Instead, there are multiple available equilibria.  These markets are 
“tippy”33—one among perhaps several competing products or standards 
will tend to achieve a dominant position, but any of them could be the 
                                                          
a broader array of software that is also compatible with other users). 
 28. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 501-02 (1998) (stating that Microsoft may even encourage 
internet service providers to feature Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser thus making 
it more difficult for users to use Netscape’s Navigator browser—Microsoft’s main 
competitor). See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(recognizing the significance of “The Applications Barrier to Entry,” which prevents any 
Intel-compatible PC operating system, other than Microsoft’s, from gaining an edge in the 
system). 
 29. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (discussing how Microsoft enjoys positive 
network effects because, for example, corporate consumers want to use an operating system 
that new employees are already familiar with, and academic consumers want to use software 
that enables them to share files with colleagues more easily). 
 30. See id. at 15 (stating that only Microsoft’s Intel-compatible PC operating systems 
will work with Intel-compatible PCs, which means that consumers who own Intel-
compatible PC systems would incur substantial costs if they decided to switch to a non-Intel 
compatible system). 
 31. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 733 (“Microsoft’s advantage may become 
sufficiently large that other competitors cannot possibly catch up, and the leader’s dominant 
position then becomes ‘locked into’ the market.”).  Obviously these advantages can be 
characterized as barriers to entry, giving Microsoft monopoly power, and giving rise to the 
antitrust issues raised in numerous federal, state, and private actions against Microsoft in 
recent years.  See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 506 (discussing the various 
antitrust issues related to the network effects of Microsoft).  However, in-depth analysis of 
these issues is beyond the scope of this Essay.  I note that the similarity between antitrust 
and antidiscrimination laws has not gone unnoticed.  Robert Cooter points out that 
discrimination by social groups can resemble cartel behavior. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 
153-54 (suggesting that such discrimination is inherently unstable).  Cooter compares 
disparate impact analysis in antidiscrimination law with the failed struggle against structural 
monopolies in antitrust law, implying that this effort is equally in vain.  Id. 
 32. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 496-97 (discussing the ebb and flow of 
the market where system markets are prone to tipping, which is where one system pulls 
ahead of rivals based on increased popularity once it has gained an initial advantage).    
 33. See KELLY, supra note 23, at 34 (charting the exponential gains associated with the 
tipping point). For a popular treatment of consumer markets that “tip,” see generally 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:  HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG 
DIFFERENCE (2000). 
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product that achieves the dominant position, and their relative features do 
not particularly determine which of them it is.34    The network benefits are 
so powerful that, given a head start and a broad user base, the market will 
accelerate toward a standard without discriminating as to which standard it 
turns out to be.35  Thus, contingent, historical factors, rather than inherent 
value, determine market domination.36  It matters more, perhaps, that Bill 
Gates dropped out of college early37 than it does that Apple’s Macintosh 
operating system was, at least early on, and arguably even now, a superior 
product.38  While certain aspects of the above portrayal are disputed by 
some,39 the existence of network advantages are widely accepted and 
viewed as being within the economic paradigm.40 
Positive feedback occurs whenever communication or interoperability 
requires that a standard be adopted, and their effects are not new.41  
Telephones, the gauge of railroad tracks, and even language42 are examples 
of markets in which a standard is adopted for historically contingent 
reasons, and then get “locked in,”43 because the same effects which made 
                                                          
 34. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 497. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 127. 
 37. See JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE:  BILL GATES AND THE MAKING 
OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE 10 (1993); see also Charles M. Gastle & Susan Boughs, 
Microsoft III and the Metes and Bounds of Software Design and Technological Tying 
Doctrine, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7 n.132 (2001), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a07-
Gastle.html (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that the advent of 
the personal computer prompted “Bill Gates to drop out of Harvard”). 
 38. See STEVEN LEVY, INSANELY GREAT:  THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MACINTOSH, THE 
COMPUTER THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING 7 (1994) (arguing that Macintosh “is the most 
important consumer product,” which will change how we view computers). 
 39. See, e.g., STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & 
MICROSOFT (1999). Skeptics of the significance of network effects typically argue either that 
significant competition nonetheless occurs in the establishment of network standards with 
benefits for consumers such as low-priced cell phones or software or that the barriers to 
entry are exaggerated.  See William J. Kolasky, Network Effects:  A Contrarian View, 7 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 577, 578 (1999) (stating that network effects, on their own, do not 
make the emergence of a “single-firm” monopoly more likely, nor do they “always create 
high barriers to entry”).  However, my claim is not that the dominance of Whiteness is 
inefficient, or that it produces monopoly profits, but that it exhibits network effects.  It is 
unlikely that any of the critics of the recent focus on network effects would argue that a 
skilled Macintosh sales person faces a level playing field. 
 40. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 484 (stating, “That network effects exist 
to a greater or lesser degree in various markets is uncontroversial . . . ”). 
 41. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 127 (describing the importance of historical effects 
when analyzing the evolution of the market). 
 42. See David G. Post, “The Free Use of Our Faculties”:  Thomas Jefferson, 
Cyberspace, and the Language of Social Life, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 407, 409-12 (2001) 
(relating the prospect of decentralized governance of the Internet to the historical debate 
over the control of the development of language). 
 43. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 116-17 (discussing how certain companies may corner 
the market if they can gain an early lead at the outset). 
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the market tip toward a standard also work to make the standard “sticky,”44 
or resistant to changing to an alternative standard. 
The potential implications of network economics for race theory are 
significant.45 The network economic theory, which is widely accepted,46 
posits that (1) contingent, historical context is important in determining 
market dominance; (2) a market might tip toward a particular standard for 
reasons other than the inherent merit or value of that standard; (3) once 
adopted, a dominant standard might become locked in and sticky; (4) the 
market might produce this outcome even where there is no single firm or 
entity guiding the maintenance of the standard; and (5) these conditions 
adhere in markets in which communication and interoperability are 
essential features.  The deep context, the systemic and coercive power, the 
unconscious47 and self-reinforcing behaviors, and the persistence that 
Critical Race Theorists have been insisting on all along with regard to 
racism are all here.  The relevant markets, in which communication and 
interoperability are essential, can be the market for employees, for retail 
customers, or the market for cultural and social norms among human 
beings, and the dominant racial standard in each of these markets is 
Whiteness. 
The remainder of this Essay is simply an exploration of this idea.  This 
Essay sets forth the basic argument that Whiteness works like a network 
standard in three important ways.  First, network effects operate in markets 
where communication and interoperability create increasing returns to 
scale,48 which drives these markets toward a single, dominant standard.49  
                                                          
 44. See id. (noting that a dominant technology in a system may lead to inflexibility). 
 45. See Margaret Chon, 1999-2000 Oliver Wendell Holmes Symposium and 
Lectureship:  The Market Place of Ideas in Cyberspace, Panel Discussion, 51 MERCER L. 
REV. 859, 874-75 (2000) (commenting that white supremacy is “a bad idea that has a large 
network base”); Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 762 (stating that the use of the LSAT in law 
school admissions constitutes a locked-in standard imposed historically by Whites acting 
intentionally as a racial cartel).  But cf. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 1839, 1907 (1996) (dismissing the idea that network economics could support the 
hiring of more than a token number of minority employees). 
 46. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 
CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1044-45 (1996) (arguing that the pressure toward standardization in 
some markets seems indisputable). 
 47. See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM:  THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 154-55 (1997) (arguing that unconscious 
mental habits and stereotypes, among other unconscious acts, perpetuate discrimination 
against Blacks); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (stating that 
because of our shared historical and cultural heritage, which has been dominated by racism, 
everyone is influenced by unconscious racism). 
 48. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 488-89 (noting that network markets 
involve products that facilitate communication between users); see generally Arthur, supra 
note 25, at 116 (analyzing the “dynamics of allocation” in our market system, which leads to 
increasing returns). 
 49. See id. (arguing that a technology that gains a lead by chance in the market may 
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In Part I, I explain that in significant respects, markets such as those for 
employees and for cultural images of people, are examples of markets in 
which the importance of communication and information tends to produce 
a single racial standard.  An important corollary of this analysis is that no 
irrational, racist malice is necessary to create and maintain the dominance 
of the racial standard. Only ordinary economic incentives are required. 
Second, because of various forms of positive feedback, network markets 
tend to “lock in” to the dominant standard, which proves “sticky,” or 
difficult to change or penetrate.  I describe in Part II how various 
complementary goods and services support Whiteness and further 
strengthen its dominance.  In addition, a collective action problem makes it 
costly for a firm or individual to switch standards unless everyone else does 
at essentially the same time.  Thus Whiteness tends to persist as a racial 
standard.  I argue that displacing Whiteness would require personal and 
institutional retraining. 
Third, the establishment of dominant standards in network markets is 
“path-dependent,” that is, it is contingent on small events and historical 
circumstance rather than optimal intrinsic features, utility, or merit.  In Part 
III I argue that the dominance of Whiteness in the economy is primarily 
due to the history of the social and legal construction of Whiteness, rather 
than to superior merit and open competition. 
I. WHITE NETWORK ECONOMICS:  HOW WHITENESS WORKS AS A 
NETWORK STANDARD 
Economists have shown that certain goods, once established as a market 
standard, reap network effects that enable them to dominate a market 
persistently.50  Examples include telephones, personal computer operating 
systems, and language.51 
The central argument of this Part is that Whiteness operates as a racial 
standard that provides network economic advantages.  An important 
consequence of this analysis is that the dominant and persistent nature of 
network standards—rather than “merit”—explains current racial disparities. 
                                                          
eventually lock in the market, leaving other technologies effectively locked out). 
 50. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 742-49 (describing that as network markets grow 
larger and more valuable, demand increases for the technology, which may lead to market 
domination and standardization). 
 51. See id. at 733-34 (noting that network economics can be applied to various 
networks including the network of the legal profession and the network of computer 
systems, among many others). 
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A. Network Economics and Standards 
A brief introduction contrasting classical and network economics is in 
order.  For conventional goods following an ordinary downward-sloping 
demand curve, consumers buy less of a commodity at higher prices.52  If 
demand greatly exceeds supply, then the commodity will be exclusive to 
the relatively few people willing to pay the high price it demands.  
Generally, as the amount of a good consumed increases, the marginal 
utility diminishes.53  As the marginal utility diminishes, the price the 
marginal purchaser is willing to pay for each additional unit also decreases.  
In other words, ordinary markets exhibit decreasing returns to scale on the 
demand side.54  Thus the ordinary instruction to a job seeker is to make 
oneself stand out, or to obtain rare skills to differentiate oneself from the 
mass of others in the employment market.  Similarly, cultural projects 
become less valuable the more often they are reproduced. 
Network economics turns that fundamental economic maxim on its head:  
network goods exhibit increasing returns to scale on the demand curve.55  
Consider the value of that archetypal network good, the telephone, if one 
person owns the only one in existence.  Since its purpose is communication 
and there is no one on the other end of the line, a single telephone is 
worthless.  In the real world, however, a telephone is so valuable it is 
considered an essential service, precisely because so many other people 
have one and can be reached through it on the telephone network, but only 
if one owns a telephone.56 
This network value is only realized if your telephone can communicate 
with other telephones through the network.  This communication requires a 
technical standard of some kind that each item must comply with in order 
to function as a telephone.  Because of increasing returns to scale, however, 
competing standards fail— even if they are technically superior—if they 
fail to attain a dominant position in the market.  No one cares if you have 
the ultimate communications gizmo (better than the telephone!) if everyone 
else is, in fact, using the telephone.  Thus network economies are driven 
toward single, dominant standards. 
                                                          
 52. See, e.g., SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 20, at 56 (demonstrating that fewer 
goods would be bought at higher prices through supply and demand graphical analysis). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 86-87 (defining marginal utility as the extra utility a consumer 
receives from “the consumption of an additional unit of a commodity”). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 89-90 (comparing the theory of marginal utility to the value of time 
to the individual). 
 55. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 484. 
 56. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985) (using a similar example with personal 
computers). 
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Network economics analysis has been extended more broadly to markets 
that do not involve the sale of goods.57  For instance, the use of a particular 
language to communicate with others is behavior that exhibits network 
effects.58  The ability to speak English is virtually useless unless there are 
others who speak the same language.  The more people there are who speak 
English, the more valuable that ability is.  English speakers share a 
common technical communication standard—here, a set of words, 
definitions, grammatical rules, and idioms—that allows them to 
communicate with a great number of people.  Thus one might expect that a 
dominant language standard would develop.  Indeed, some claim that 
despite intense cultural and nationalist opposition, English is becoming the 
de facto worldwide language standard, especially for business, scientific, 
and tourism purposes.59 
A product need not involve direct communications to produce network 
effects.  Increasing returns can result if products are merely functionally 
compatible.60  An operating system like Microsoft Windows will benefit a 
user even if nobody else owns (or leases) it.  However, its value increases 
as the number of users increase.  People can share documents with others 
using the same word processing software, or share disks with other people 
using the same operating system.  Here, the technical standard involved 
enables not communication but compatibility with regard to skills, 
applications, and work product.61 
                                                          
 57. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 491. 
 58. Id. at 489-91. 
 59. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust:  An Essay on American Languages, 
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 347 (1992). 
 60. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 424 (stressing the need for products of 
different firms within a network to be compatible). 
 61. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that, because of Microsoft’s monopoly over the PC operating system and the internet 
browser market, its product is valuable to the owner).  Legal scholarship in this area has 
also, for the most part, related to antitrust implications. See, e.g., LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, 
supra note 39, at 247-49 (recounting the origins of Microsoft’s antitrust cases); David S. 
Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 
ANTITRUST 36 (1996) (noting that only a few entities tend to dominate “Network 
industries,” thus giving cause for antitrust concerns); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, 
at 500-23 (claiming that existing antitrust laws adequately address issues raised by 
networks); Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry:  Lessons from the 
Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 87-88 (2001) (discussing how networks affect entry 
into an industry).  In the antitrust context, the issue is generally whether network effects 
comprise a barrier to entry into a market, resulting in inefficient monopoly profits and the 
exclusion of more efficient competitors.  See, e.g., LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 39, 
at 128 (demonstrating that network standards can be efficient); see also Werden, supra, at 
97-108 (considering whether network effects constitute economic barriers to entry).  
Scholars applying network economic analysis to other areas of law similarly focus on 
efficiency.  See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 734 (claiming that admissions standards in the 
legal education market are inefficient).  I do not contest the claim that standards in network 
economies are efficient.  However, I assume for the purposes of this paper that market 
efficiency does not justify racial subordination.  It may be that we need not shed a tear for 
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B. A Dominant Racial Standard  
Whiteness is a network standard in two respects.  First, it can operate as 
an actual technical standard that limits access to networks.  If you do not 
comply with the standard, you are completely excluded from working or 
communicating with those who are using it.  You may as well be a 
telegraph operator trying to make someone’s telephone ring. 
Non-White people are not, of course, literally excluded in this way.  
With the demise of de jure racial discrimination, as well as the universal 
condemnation of intentional racism, Whiteness is not generally a formal 
requirement for any position or function. 
One instance in which Whiteness may be considered a technical standard 
might be when casting an actor for a part that is seen as inflexibly requiring 
a White person, such as Hamlet or George Washington.  A non-White actor 
will never be able to meet the technical standard of being White.62 
Second, and more broadly, Whiteness is a dominant network standard in 
the sense that it is the default race.  People are presumed to be White unless 
otherwise stated.  Thus the “standard” judge, teacher, student, or 
customer—the standard person—is imagined to be White.  In particular, 
the standard employee in many cases is presumed to be White.  Although 
an employer could overcome this presumption when faced with a non-
White applicant, it would nonetheless be an initial presumption burdening 
the applicant. 
Absent economic advantages, overcoming this second type of “default” 
standard might simply require an employer with flexibility and 
imagination.  The extent to which there might be network racial advantages 
depends in part on the extent to which non-White employees can 
communicate and work with White employees.  Thus the following 
analysis focuses on ways in which the ability to communicate across racial 
lines might be impeded.  If people of different races are unable to 
communicate, then they are, in a sense, technically incapable of becoming 
part of the same network. 
Note that my example of the first type of standard described above—a 
racial requirement in casting actors for parts—is not truly a technical 
requirement in the sense that it would be physically impossible for a non-
White actor to play a part.  A director with enough imagination might 
overcome this standard, although to be feasible, this flexibility would also 
                                                          
the superior but unused Beta videotapes, Macintosh computers and Netscape Web browsers.  
I presume that meritorious but unemployed people of color deserve greater sympathy. 
 62. See Neil Gotanda, Asian Americans and the “Miss Saigon Syndrome”, in ASIAN 
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1087-88 (Hyung-
chan Kim ed., 1992) (noting that actors exhibiting Whiteness are nonetheless welcome to 
perform non-White roles). 
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have to be shared by the producer and the audience.  Similarly, a manager 
making an employment decision contrary to the default standard must 
overcome not only personal reservations, but must also keep in mind the 
possible reservations of customers, coworkers, and superiors.63  Thus the 
two kinds of standards operate along a spectrum of flexibility:  the least 
flexible preferences for Whiteness operate as a technical standard, while 
more flexible preferences for Whiteness operate merely as a default 
presumption. 
Either way, the Whiteness standard means that the ordinary economic 
advice to “stand out” is reversed with regard to race.  Non-White applicants 
are well advised not to try to stand out by emphasizing their racial 
differences.64  Employers, recognizing the incompatibility of the non-White 
applicant with the dominant White standard, are likely less inclined to hire 
non-White individuals.  Advertising agencies or movie and television 
producers might be advised not to develop or cast non-White lead 
characters or models.  This reversal of the ordinary advice is a hint that 
network economics may be involved.65 
The ordinary discourse regarding racial identity is that because race is, or 
should be, irrelevant to employment, employees should not “inject” race 
into a situation by being outspoken about their racial identity.66  Note that 
White employees are not seen as introducing race issues no matter how 
White—say, suburban and preppy—they present themselves.  By viewing 
Whiteness as a racial standard, we see that in this discourse it is not race 
that is irrelevant.  It is Blackness (or Asian-ness, etc.) that is irrelevant.  In 
other words, race is irrelevant only so long as one meets the default 
standard of being White. 
C. Interoperability:  Communication and Culture 
In the information economy, the ability to communicate—to 
meaningfully receive and transmit information—has become recognized as 
a crucial economic asset.67  That asset is embodied most significantly in 
                                                          
 63. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., 685 F. Supp. 224, 225 (N.D. Ala. 1988) 
(referring to a supervisor who was concerned about how it would look to have “a n—  
foreman with all my white customers”).    
 64. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-20 (2001) (emphasizing the performative nature of race within an 
institution; individual employees of color must choose how to perform their race in order to 
be racially palatable to their employers). 
 65. Critical Race Theorists have noted that the “transparency” of Whiteness is the 
source of much of what has come to be called “White privilege.”  See BARBARA J. FLAGG, 
WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE:  WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 65 (1998) 
(analyzing Whites’ reliance on Blacks for explanations of racism). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Kevin Kelly goes so far as to insist that in the new economy, “[t]he net is our 
future.”  KELLY, supra note 23, at 9. 
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people.  Workers are now information and knowledge brokers.68  
Especially in this context, race makes a difference.  First, race often 
correlates strongly with verbal communication style, dialect, or accent.69  
Second, race correlates with distinct cultural references and beliefs,70 which 
facilitate trust, social comfort, and communication.71  Finally, race itself 
communicates because racial subjects are perceived through a complex 
series of racial images regarding competence, beliefs, and attitudes, which 
comprise cultural and social norms that compete for dominance.72   
Whether a market tips towards a dominant standard depends in part on 
the demand for variety.73  If consumers prefer to buy unique jewelry, a 
dominant standard will not develop.  One might expect that in markets 
where demand for variety is high, the need for interoperability will be low.  
There is no need for one’s jewelry to match that of others.  Hence, high 
demand for variety and low economies of scale tend against tipping a 
market towards a dominant standard.74  The recent emphasis on racial 
diversity as an important value can be seen as an effort to counterbalance 
the efficiency pressure towards racial homogeneity.75  However, if the 
preference for racial variety is weak or vague, it will not overcome the 
network effects of the strong communication function. 
1. Verbal communication:  language, dialect, and accent  
To the extent that employees must communicate with colleagues, 
customers or clients, and employees at other firms or agencies, they serve a 
communicative function.  If race correlates with factors that affect the 
ability to communicate effectively, then network effects may exist.  
                                                          
 68. ROBERT B. REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS 60-62 (2001). 
 69. See discussion infra at Part I.C.1. 
 70. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
56-59 (1991) (emphasizing that race cannot be viewed as distinct from “culture, community, 
and consciousness”). 
 71. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 3-12 (1995) (arguing that only societies with a high 
degree of social trust will be able to compete). 
 72. See Gotanda, supra note 70, at 56 (stating that a color-blind assimilationist ideal 
neglects positive aspects of race, particularly cultural components, and that failure to 
recognize this key aspect of race amounts to cultural genocide); see Lawrence, supra note 
47, at 322-23 (asserting that racism in America remains dominant in part due to the 
unconscious transmission of racially discriminatory attitudes to children through adults’ 
behavior); Reginald Leamon Robinson, White Cultural Matrix and the Language of 
Nonverbal Advertising in Housing Segregation:  Toward an Aggressive Theory of Liability, 
25 CAP. U. L. REV. 101, 120 (1996) (defining “culture” as a system of beliefs, symbols, and 
rules through which people organize and understand the world in which they live). 
 73. Gotanda, supra note 70, at 56. 
 74. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762 (2003) (emphasizing that due to the impact of anti-
discrimination laws and changing social norms regarding diversity, the incentive for a 
homogenous environment is minimal). 
 75. See id. at 1788 (criticizing the tendency of employers to promote homogeneity to 
realize “truth, fairness, and loyalty” in the workplace). 
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Consider at the most fundamental and direct level of analysis, actual 
language barriers.  A common language is a communications standard that 
operates as a network standard.76  It would be difficult to argue that 
someone who actually could not communicate with others because of a 
language barrier was not disadvantaged in the workplace.77  Certainly 
language, inextricably entwined with identity and culture,78 correlates at 
least partly with national origin and race.79  Whether or not this effect is 
appropriate or fair, my only point here is that the English language standard 
is important in employment, and has the effect of excluding non-English 
speakers.80 
A slightly less direct example of a racial communication barrier in 
network markets is Black English.81  An illustrative scenario appears in the 
movie “Airplane!”82  In an exaggerated African-American dialect, two 
Black passengers speak to each other and to the confused White flight 
                                                          
 76. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 489. 
 77. But see Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:  Accent, Anti-discrimination Law, and 
a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1377-78 (1991) 
(questioning the assumption that accents necessarily disadvantage speakers when seeking 
employment). 
 78. But see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 258 (1994) (challenging the myth 
that ethnicity plays a predominant role in an individual’s ability to learn a specific 
language); Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense:  Why Title VII Should Protect Speakers of 
Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 652-54 (1998) (discussing the intrinsic and 
biological basis of the language function, and asserting that the lack of proper education in 
standard English results in blacks using different speech). 
 79. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust:  The Relationship 
Between Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 145, 146-47 (1997) (identifying the causal link between state Official-
English laws and private attacks on non-government speech); Robert S. Chang & Keith 
Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 
1409-12 (1998) (discussing language disputes involving Asian-Americans); Allison M. 
Dussias, Waging War With Words:  Native Americans’ Continuing Struggle Against the 
Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 923-28 (1999); Grace A. Pasigan, 
Sign Language:  Colonialism and the Battle Over Text, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 625, 636-
41 (1997).  See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991) (contemplating 
the correlation of race and language). 
 80. See Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Language Minorities:  Forgotten Victims of 
Discrimination, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 759 (1997) (claiming language discrimination is 
a growing factor in employment discrimination).  Much of the literature in this area 
discusses Official English or English-Only laws.  See, e.g., Bender, supra note 79, at 146-
47; Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:  
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the 
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
1347, 1349 (1997); Perea, supra note 59, at 355 (claiming that language has often been the 
root of discrimination against non-English speakers). Generally the importance of a single 
language standard for genuine employment-related communication purposes is not 
contested.  However, these laws also regulate the use of language in settings where the 
employer’s interest is less direct, and they often arise in circumstances in which a particular 
ethnic group is targeted.  See Chang & Aoki, supra note 79, at 1409-12; Pasigan, supra note 
79, at 627. 
 81. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 652. 
 82. AIRPLANE! (Paramount Pictures 1980). 
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attendant.  A “translation” is presented in “Standard English”83 subtitles 
along the bottom of the screen.  The joke is that the passengers might as 
well be speaking a foreign language considering their ability to 
communicate with the attendant.  A fellow passenger—an elderly, 
distinguished-looking White woman—offers to help, saying, “I speak 
Jive.”  She proceeds to “translate” the Black passengers’ requests, and then 
replies to them in the same exaggerated dialect, complete with “attitude.”  
The incongruity of the White woman’s appearance and the language 
coming out of her mouth is another joke that plays on the cultural and class 
connotations of race. 
While this example is exaggerated, the point remains that people 
speaking English communicate in racially identifiable ways that are not 
always easily understood across racial lines.  Thus, at the simplest level, 
employers might hire Whites because they tend to communicate better with 
White customers, other White employees, and the White employees of 
other firms, because they speak the same dialect.  This serves as a technical 
standard. 
The debate over Black English, or Ebonics, for example, often comes 
down to whether or not to recognize inherent value in having a distinct 
American dialect.84  Proponents note that African-American dialect has 
identifiable rules of grammar and syntax, sometimes traced to African 
roots,85 and thus ought to be recognized86 and even studied as a true dialect, 
rather than being dismissed as simply “bad English.”87  This is a merit 
argument.  The proponents are claiming that in substantive, objective 
terms, Black English is a coherent and inherently valid language of its own, 
and therefore should be given respect and recognition equal to that given to 
Standard English. 
The pragmatic response, of course, is that it simply does not matter 
whether Ebonics has a cognizable and inherently valid structure.  In order 
to participate in the broader world, one must learn to speak the standard 
                                                          
 83. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 658 (discussing “Standard Language Ideology” as a 
bias toward a homogenous spoken language imposed by dominant institutions); see also 
ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT:  LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1997) (claiming dominant institutions play a 
lead role in establishing a dominant language). 
 84. See, e.g., Lori Olszewski, Oakland Schools OK Black English, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 
19, 1996, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi? 
file=/chronicle/archive/1996/12/19/MN11848.DTL.   
 85. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 662-73 (citing the Linguistic Society of America’s 
unanimous support for the Oakland School Board’s decision to recognize Black English). 
 86. See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE:  CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN 
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 190 (1999) (raising the possibility of Asian-Americans aiding 
in resistance to English-Only laws). 
 87. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 642 (observing that most school administrators 
equate Black English with poor grammar). 
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American dialect or risk being unable to communicate effectively.88  
Network effects drive culture toward a single dominant dialect and 
therefore devalue competing standards. 
The extent to which this language standard serves as a racial barrier to 
workforce participation89 depends, of course, on a racial generalization.  
Most African-Americans are of course capable of speaking Standard 
English and do so.  Note that when African-Americans speak Standard 
English, they do not “sound Black.”  Thus the dialect analysis can extend to 
instances where, rather than prohibiting communication entirely, dialect 
serves instead to identify the race of the speaker.  Studies have shown that 
people can identify the race of an unseen speaker—say, over the phone—
with a high degree of accuracy.90 
Commentators who have focused on this as linguistic profiling91 or 
accent discrimination92 seem to be describing a subtle way to effect old-
fashioned intentional discrimination:  the listener determines the race of the 
caller and then discriminates based on racist stereotypes.93  This method 
might also be used to identify and discriminate against callers based not 
only on race but also on sexual orientation, and national or regional origin, 
i.e., immigrants and Southerners. 
While these forms of invidious discrimination undoubtedly occur, a 
network economic analysis might produce an account of incentives for 
accent discrimination, even in the absence of racist intent or bias.  For 
example, a listener who is expecting, or is simply accustomed to hearing, a 
White voice on the telephone might be slightly surprised or disturbed to 
hear a non-White speaker instead.94  This would be an example of 
                                                          
 88. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 50 (2002). 
 89. See Gaulding, supra note 78, at 643-46 (reviewing studies showing that Black 
English speakers are at a disadvantage in every aspect of employment). 
 90. See, e.g., Lis Wiehl, “Sounding Black” in the Courtroom:  Court-Sanctioned Racial 
Sterotyping, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 185 (2002) (citing a Kentucky court case where 
the court held a police officer was reasonable in determining a suspect was Black on the 
basis of the sound of his voice); see also Rhea v. State, 147 S.W. 463, 472-73 (Ark. 1912) 
(upholding a conviction based on identified race of a White speaker’s voice); Clifford v. 
Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Ky. 1999) (upholding a conviction based on a witness 
identification of the race of a speaker as Black by his voice); Matsuda, supra note 77, at 
1337 (suggesting that a prevailing prejudice against an accent is prone “to cause some 
listeners to ‘turn off’ and not comprehend it”). 
 91. See Michael Erard, The Role of Profiling in American Society:  Linguistic Profiling, 
5 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 225, 228 (2003) (arguing that allowing witnesses to testify as to 
the racial characteristics of a speaker’s voice embodies racial profiling). 
 92. See Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1350 (citing courts’ recognition of accent 
discrimination); see also Gaulding, supra note 78, at 646 n.149 (referring to studies that 
demonstrate employers believe a person with a Standard English accent, in addition to 
having better grammar, is more likely to have other more desirable personality traits). 
 93. See Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1347. 
 94. Discussing his theory of racial stigmatization, Glenn Loury writes: 
Everything depends, I am arguing, on racially biased social cognitions that cause 
some situations to appear anomalous, disquieting, contrary to expectation, worthy 
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Whiteness working as a default standard.  The listener might, as a 
consequence, feel more awkward or uncomfortable than one would if the 
speaker was White.  If the listener was unable or unwilling to overcome the 
disturbance, or to understand the accented words, then this failure to meet 
the racial norm in voice communication would work as a technical standard 
to exclude an incompatible speaker—the speaker’s effectiveness at 
communicating information, making a sale, establishing rapport, or 
forming a social bond would be diminished. 
A light accent does not interfere with “actual” communication.95  That is, 
the listener understands the spoken words.  However, communication 
consists of much more than the transmission of words.  Individuals also 
communicate intent, meaning, and identity through gait, posture, facial 
expression, physical proximity, and eye contact.  Indeed, the entire range of 
social context in which the communication takes place also influences the 
transmission of meaning.96  These forms of communication may be 
received peripherally or subconsciously, but affect the meaning 
communicated.  Thus, a more nuanced examination of effective interracial 
communication must include at least a cursory review of broader avenues 
of communication through cultural competence and racial stereotyping. 
2. Culture  
To the extent that dialect, accent, and the social conventions that 
comprise nonverbal forms of communication are determined by culture, 
and culture is integral to communication, Whiteness constitutes a kind of 
racial cultural literacy that is essential to communication.97  Thus, someone 
might, on the basis of a brief phone interview, determine that the speaker 
                                                          
of further investigation, inconsistent with the natural order of things—while other 
situations appear normal, about right, in keeping with what one might expect, 
consistent with the social world as we know it. 
LOURY, supra note 88, at 71. 
 95. On the other hand, I have observed that when listeners expect, perhaps on the basis 
of race, not to understand the speaker’s speech, they become incapable of interpreting even 
a slight accent.  Thus, a White store clerk confronted with an Asian immigrant customer and 
expecting to hear a “foreign” language fails to understand the customer’s lightly accented 
English.  Indeed, the listener’s attitude determines whether communication is successful.  
The clerk’s complaint that it is “impossible” to communicate with Asian foreigners fulfills 
itself.  See Wiehl, supra note 90, at 194 (describing an experiment in which different 
listeners of an identical speech recording matched with videotape footage of children of 
different races assessed the speech differently for fluency and for being “standard”); see 
also Matsuda, supra note 77, at 1376-79 (discussing “the problem of the prejudiced 
listener”). 
 96. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1169 
(1985).  See generally Anthony P. Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 
457 (1997). 
 97. Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 734. 
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sounds like someone who will fit in and work out well within the specific 
workplace.98 
Consider the following:  “Man, did you catch Duval on the back nine?  
He’s three back on the 16th and goes birdie-eagle-birdie with a chip from 
the bunker to win the British Open!  Damn!”99 
The statement not only requires familiarity with the intricacies and rules 
of golf, golfers, and the significance of a particular tournament, but also 
presumes a shared enthusiasm and a common affinity for a certain style of 
discourse about sports.  It is imbedded in culture.100 
There can, of course, be cross-cultural communication.  However, to the 
extent that there are cultural differences among races,101 racial homogeneity 
results in shared cultural references within racial groups.102  These shared 
cultural references can in turn enhance communication and productivity.103  
Employers can have greater confidence that their employees will share 
certain values with regard to work habits or general attitudes towards 
work,104 family, and government.  They will be more likely to understand 
each other’s jokes, and identify when a joke is being made.  They are likely 
to have more in common to discuss.  Potential employees who are 
culturally White and can speak “White” are more literate in a 
communication standard that will allow the employer to reap network 
benefits.105  Indeed, the argument for cultural homogeneity on utilitarian 
grounds is often made expressly in the debate over “multiculturalism.”106 
                                                          
 98. See Wiehl, supra note 90, at 186 (citing a Kentucky Supreme Court case where a 
police officer’s deduction that a speaker’s voice indicated a specific race represented proper 
testimony). 
 99. Thanks to E. Stewart Moritz for his help with the nuances of translation. 
 100. As part of their sophisticated body of work on the performative aspects of racial 
identity in the workplace, Carbado and Gulati explore in particular the communication 
problems that arise through workplace conversations. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu 
Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000). 
 101. See Gotanda, supra note 70, at 56 (asserting that the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
color-blind constitutionalism ignores, and thereby devalues, unique cultural components 
such as custom, belief, and intellectual and artistic traditions that distinguish races from one 
another). 
 102. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74 (discussing racial homogeneity as 
an economic asset in the workplace); see also Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? “Gangsta” 
Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 323-40 
(2000) (describing the development of oppositional cultural norms in Black urban 
communities). 
 103. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74, at 1795-1802 (discussing incentives for 
homogeneity). 
 104. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 133-34 (2000) (discussing racial 
discrimination as a signal to other in-group members that one will be a loyal worker). 
 105. Carbado and Gulati observe that not only must racial outsiders negotiate their 
identity in the workplace, but they must do so against a headwind consisting of stereotypes 
about their outsider status.  Thus, neither a Black employee combating stereotypes about 
laziness nor a female employee battling stereotypes about her commitment to her career are 
as free to choose to go home early or to decline work as is a White male employee.  Carbado 
& Gulati, supra note 100, at 110-12.  Roithmayr argues similarly that the value placed on 
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In this regard, note the prevalence of “private” social discrimination that 
is often described as “benign” or “natural.”107  Commentators have noted 
that Black and White Americans lead lives that are publicly integrated but 
privately segregated; they may work at an integrated workplace, but often 
go home to segregated neighborhoods, worship in segregated 
congregations, and enjoy different forms of cultural entertainment.108  The 
sources of this de facto segregation are, without doubt, complex and varied.  
Here, I simply observe that the social ease that results when parties of the 
same race are able to interact without having to “deal with” race produces a 
system that functions most efficiently when all of the interacting parties are 
of the same race. 
Thus, language, culture, and personal comfort in the context of social 
segregation produce network effects that push the market toward a 
dominant standard.  The efficient choice for employers is to hire employees 
who already use the cultural operating system that is the norm, in the same 
way that businesses are well advised to use the Windows operating system 
rather than Apple’s Macintosh, regardless of the relative qualitative 
merits109 of the two systems. 
3. Stereotypes  
Beyond the effectiveness of direct and indirect communications among 
individuals by means of their speech and behavior, race communicates 
through stereotypes and images.  Thus the young Black male in a White 
neighborhood addressing a fearful White homemaker at her doorstep may 
be incapable of communicating, through any effort of his own, an ordinary 
sales pitch for vinyl siding.  Her perception of poverty, lawlessness, and 
                                                          
White cultural practices in the legal education market gives White people the advantage of 
lower costs of production, because they have easier access to the transmission of White 
cultural norms.  Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 754-55. 
 106. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 104 (1992); 
Sylvia R. Lazos Varga, Deconstructing Homo[Geneous] Americanus:  The White Ethnic 
Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1507 (1998) 
(asserting that the utilitarian justification for cultural homogeneity is that the process of 
assimilating immigrants from cultures similar to the Anglo-Saxon culture is less stressful on 
the host group and results in less social conflict). 
 107. See, e.g., RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 185 (2001) (observing that, in 
explaining marital choices, Americans focus on similarity of background without 
characterizing them as racial discriminations and fail to acknowledge how such a focus 
creates a pattern of segregation that is taken for granted). 
 108. See, e.g., LEONARD STEINHORN & BARBARA DIGGS-BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR 
SKIN:  THE ILLUSION OF INTEGRATION AND THE REALITY OF RACE (1999); ANDREW HACKER, 
TWO NATIONS:  BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992). 
 109. One might debate whether characteristics that affect an individual’s ability to 
communicate should not be included in the definition of “merit.”  My intent is merely to 
note that communication, including the messages that race convey in contemporary culture, 
plays a large part in the ability of an individual to participate in a network economy that has 
adopted a racial standard of Whiteness. 
LEE.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 1/17/2005  11:21:43 AM 
2004] NETWORK EFFECTS OF WHITENESS 1279 
propensity for physical violence prevents her from understanding him as 
someone offering household services for sale.110 
His task of overcoming the default standard of Whiteness is difficult in 
light of the messages that his race communicates.  He is identified as an 
outsider; he has invaded private space; he matches the popular image of a 
dangerous or violent person.111  He can, of course, attempt to overcome 
these disabilities by affecting a pleasant and non-threatening disposition, 
and by wearing neat, orthodox clothing.112  Generally, door-to-door sales 
are a difficult business, and all who try it must develop strategies to make it 
work.  Nonetheless, some strategies are foreclosed according to the 
communication that race sends. This salesperson is racially incompatible 
with the network standard because of stereotypes. 
Moreover, race communicates for the employer as well as for the 
employee.  Consider the role of the public spokesperson.  An individual 
represents a public official, government agency, or private firm to the 
media, and indirectly to the entire public. To the extent that race 
communicates a message to the American audience, a firm must be careful 
with regard to the race of the individual who represents it.113  This is true of 
all front-office, direct sales, or “window” positions with high visibility.114  
The communicative aspect of race would have somewhat less impact in the 
back room, the accounting office, or the research lab. 
Some kinds of employment might combine a direct or indirect 
communicative effect with a stereotype communicative effect. Consider, 
for instance, the corporate lawyer.  Lawyers must communicate effectively 
with staff, with colleagues, with their counterparts at other firms with 
whom they do business, with clients, and with the clerks, judges and juries 
within the judicial system.  They must employ the direct language 
communication tools of prose, idiom, and metaphor.  They must also 
                                                          
 110. Her racial stereotypes may or may not be “irrational.”  See generally ARMOUR, 
supra note 47 (exploring whether such racial stereotypes are rational).  My point here is not 
that her racism prevents him from succeeding, but that the social context renders him unable 
to communicate with her and excludes him from the network economy. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK (1999) (describing the 
discrimination lawsuit eventually brought by a Black corporate lawyer who always tried to 
fit into his White surroundings). 
 113. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, A Limited Partnership, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at A1 
(describing a partnership of internet entrepreneurs in which the White partner became the 
spokesperson). 
 114. See Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and 
Employment Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113(3) Q. J. OF ECON. 835, 845-47 (1998) 
(finding that that the racial composition of a business’ customers has a substantial effect on 
the race of the person who gets hired, particularly in jobs that involve direct contact with 
customers), available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item /default.asp?sid=80AE70CB-
8038-4502-A7D9-2068740DDF9A&ttype=6&tid=460.  Note that rather than focusing on 
suggesting invidious discrimination by buyers or patrons, my focus is on market power and 
the impact of communication standards. 
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master the cultural references, such as conferences, drinks, golf, and gender 
dynamics.  The message that their race sends is unavoidable.115 
Stereotypes greatly complicate the already tenuous communication 
situation that exists when an employee is trying to make a good impression 
but must consider, in addition to all of the typical considerations, the 
employer’s preconceptions about the employee.116 
The stereotypes need not be dramatic ones, such as that a Black male is a 
dangerous criminal.  Because network effects depend on effective 
communication, all that is necessary for race to exhibit a network effect is 
for a stereotype to impede communication.  Identifying the race of another 
person and then assuming, based on race, that the person will not be able to 
chat about golf, have a different attitude towards the police, or disagree 
about affirmative action and the general fairness of the marketplace, will 
hamper communication, regardless of whether those assumptions are true.  
These communication barriers can of course be overcome with conscious 
effort.  That extra effort, however, is a transaction cost that is not present 
for employees who meet the racial standard.117 
4. In general 
 In general, my claim is that language, culture, and stereotypes 
compromise interracial communications barriers that make non-Whites 
incompatible with a network standard and therefore inefficient to hire.  
While plausible, these observations are certainly speculative.  I have not 
attempted a mathematical or empirical proof.  However, determining the 
precise cause of interracial communication barriers is not essential to this 
argument.  One need only presume that White people, especially White 
Americans, generally (but of course not always) communicate better with 
each other than with non-Whites.  I take it as common background 
knowledge that this is so. Specifically, I assume that Whites generally 
communicate better with other Whites as coworkers within firms, as 
employees dealing with customers, and as employees dealing with the 
employees of other firms. 
To the extent that this is so, every employer, regardless of their race, has 
economic cause to prefer to hire employees that will not experience this 
communication barrier.  Because most of those coworkers, customers, and 
counterparts are White, the employer ought to prefer White employees, all 
                                                          
 115. Carbado and Gulati have shown that in law firms, women and minority associates 
must negotiate stereotypes regarding their competence and beliefs, which in turn interferes 
with their ability to negotiate work assignments freely and hurts their prospects for 
advancement.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 100, at 117 and accompanying text. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cf. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:  A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO 
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 33-37 (1999). 
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else being equal.118 And this is so regardless of whether the racial 
domination of Whiteness among these populations is due to sheer numbers 
or to historical advantage. 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF WHITENESS:  LOCK-IN AND STICKY STANDARDS 
Economist Brian Arthur has described how positive feedback magnifies 
the effects of small economic shifts, and can drive markets towards any of 
several competing standards.119  In economic terms, network markets 
exhibit several possible equilibrium points.  There is no guarantee that the 
particular economic outcome selected will be the “best” one.120 
Furthermore, once random historical events set the market on a particular 
path, the choice may become locked-in, regardless of the advantages of the 
alternatives.121  Thus if one product, firm or nation in a competitive 
marketplace gets ahead by “chance,” it tends to stay ahead and even 
increase its lead.122  This kind of “path dependence” results when small 
“random” events accumulate and become magnified by positive feedbacks 
so as to determine the eventual outcome.123 
Such phenomena as the location of cities and the geographic 
concentration of high technology industries have been characterized as the 
result of feedback effects regarding access to markets, support services, 
complementary goods, and the availability of individuals with the 
necessary experience and know-how.124 
Beyond the direct operation of network effects through shared 
communication standards, Whiteness also persists as the dominant racial 
standard because of positive feedback effects that continually reinforce its 
dominance.125  Any dynamic that causes Whiteness to increase in value 
when it becomes more widely adopted as a standard can create a positive 
feedback loop that causes the standard to “lock in,” or become “sticky,” 
and resistant to change.126  Simple economies of scale can contribute to this 
effect.127 
                                                          
 118. See Holzer & Ihlanfeldt, supra note 114, at 859 (finding that a racial preference for 
employees that reflects the racial composition of a business’ customers reduces the overall 
labor demand and wages for blacks). 
 119. See Arthur, supra note 25, at 116. 
 120. Id. at 116-17. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92-99 
(1990).  
 125. See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative 
Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (2002) (maintaining that law school admissions 
standards operate as a positive feedback loop that reinforces and strengthens the advantage 
of White applicants over applicants of other races). 
 126. Cf. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 425 (exploring the dynamics of positive 
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A. Switching Costs 
Switching costs are the costs of switching from one standard to 
another.128  They play a role in determining whether a product or service 
becomes an enduring standard.  If the switching costs are high, it becomes 
more difficult to induce consumers to change their behavior.  For example, 
entire cherished record collections became outmoded when the CD was 
introduced, slowing its acceptance.129  The loss of the value of those LPs 
represents a cost of switching to the proposed new standard.  In this 
example of course, the switching costs were overcome, despite the protests 
of many avid audiophiles. 
Note that even when switching costs are low, they can be critical. “A 
million customers, each of whom has switching costs of $100, are just as 
valuable, collectively, as a single customer whose switching costs are $100 
million.”130 
High individual or collective switching costs can represent a kind of 
positive feedback as the installed base of users becomes more committed to 
a standard.131  Their investment in the standard is what stands to be lost if 
they switch.  These costs can be in the form of physical goods, but can also 
be the psychic costs of loosening strong psychological or emotional 
commitments.132 
With regard to a racial standard, one must consider the level of 
commitment that the installed base of employers, employees, and 
consumers of cultural images has to Whiteness.  Although many Whites 
claim not to be especially aware of race, they identify their own race with 
confidence, and studies suggest that the value they place on this 
identification is extraordinarily high.133 
One example of a kind of direct switching cost might be in the area of 
cultural images.  Many of the icons of popular culture are White.  Our 
political leadership is predominantly White. Similarly, most of the eminent 
figures in the dominant American historical narrative are White. 
                                                          
feedback loops creating market dominance). 
 127. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 494-95. 
 128. Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 775. 
 129. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 11. 
 130. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 108 (discussing “Mass Market Lock-in”). 
 131. See Roithmayr, supra note 27, at 775 (observing that male decision-makers tend to 
select job applicants and employees to mentor based on preexisting contacts and 
commonalities that correlate with gender). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See generally FLAGG, supra note 65, at 29 (asserting that Whites perceive and 
interact with other Whites as individuals who have no significant racial characteristics, 
leading to circumstances where Whites rely on White referents to formulate the norms and 
expectations of White decision-makers to the detriment of minorities). 
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One might explain that the majority of the White population simply feels 
more affinity with White celebrities, politicians, and historical figures.  
Setting aside the presumed naturalness of Whiteness implicit in that 
explanation,134 note that White racial identity and racial identification are 
essential to it.  A White person must recognize and identify with both her 
own Whiteness and the Whiteness of the cultural icon for this kind of racial 
affinity to apply. 
In order to establish non-White cultural images as preeminent in the 
national imagination, Whites must give up this racial identity and affinity.  
What would it take for Whites to feel an equal affinity toward Black 
politicians, to identify with African-American historical figures as being 
“our” heroes rather than “their” heroes, or for White children commonly 
and comfortably to choose Black dolls?135  These might be examples of 
psychic or emotional switching costs in the displacement of racial identities 
and images. 
Recently, of course, the all-White (and male) pantheon of heroes and 
protagonists has in fact had to change in order to make room for others.  So 
the psychic switching costs are, to some extent, being paid.  White 
resentment and backlash demonstrate that, in some cases, the costs are not 
being paid voluntarily and that they are in fact painful.136 
Some of the changes have required new textbooks, new curricula, and in 
the case of streets and buildings now named after Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., new signage.  Resistance to renaming Chink’s Peak in Idaho in 2001 
included the argument that renaming the mountain would not be 
historically accurate.137  Some historical literary works have fallen out of 
favor because they represent a more consciously racist viewpoint.  These 
are actual switching costs. 
More importantly, one might note where changes have not occurred.  
The emotional attachment of Cleveland baseball fans to their grinning, red-
skinned mascot, Chief Wahoo, is unwavering.  The ubiquity of this image 
                                                          
 134. See Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, “What Are You?” Hapa Girl and Multi-Cultural 
Identity, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 463, 482 (2000) (observing that Whiteness is so ingrained as 
the cultural norm that, once an individual is identified as White, race “fades almost 
instantaneously from white consciousness into transparency”). 
 135. See WALDO E. MARTIN JR., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION:  A BRIEF HISTORY 
WITH DOCUMENTS (1998).  Social psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark devised a doll 
test as a way to gauge evidence of personality dysfunction among black children under Jim 
Crow.  When asked to choose between a white doll and a black doll, a preponderence of the 
black children expressed a preference for the white doll. 
 136. See, e.g., 2002:  A Critical Year for European-Americans, 53 DAVID DUKE REP. 
(The David Duke Report, Mandeville, La.), 2002, at 1 (contending that American schools 
ban all mention of Christians, while promoting “Black pagan celebrations such as Kwanza,” 
and decrying the “primitive Black rhythms” that pervades White homes on MTV). 
 137. Ji Hyun Lim, All in a Name:  Chinks Peak, ASIAN WEEK, Oct. 4, 2001, available at 
http://www.asianweek.com/2001_09_28/news_chinkspeak.html. 
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in northern Ohio on cars, on clothes, and in front yards represents both 
emotional commitment and sunk costs.  The story of “Little Black Sambo” 
has been republished with a White illustrator who said, “We [White 
people] look at [the story] with affection.”138  The Confederate flag 
continues to be displayed on the grounds of the Georgia State capitol.  One 
account ascribes the recent electoral defeat of a popular Georgia governor 
to his support for changing the state flag of Georgia to reduce the eminence 
of the Confederate flag.139 
Many of these costs represent sentimental attachments to historic 
images.  There is great nostalgia for the “good old days.”  Note, however, 
that there is little sentimental longing for outhouses, the lack of air-
conditioning, and explicit racial subjugation. The attachment is to images 
that happen to be of industrious and meritorious White persons,140 and, 
typically, the absence of racial others.  One might see in this attachment a 
form of property, that over time, familiarity and possession ripen into 
ownership.141  One senses that objections to newly written histories—
histories that note the racist sensibilities of traditional White American 
heroes and introduce the contributions and struggles of other populations—
are, in essence, property claims—“[t]hey are taking away our history.”  To 
the extent that that history is a narrative representation that muddies and 
ignores the racist origins of the country, this complaint is accurate:  the 
multiculturalists have targeted that history for replacement.142 
Uncertainty represents a type of switching cost when the reliability of the 
old standard is a known quantity and the reliability of the proposed 
replacement is less certain.  One might reassure oneself by doing further 
research, but this merely replaces uncertainty costs with search costs. 
Here, an employer or employee who has never hired or worked with an 
African-American or other non-White employee might hesitate simply 
because of the uncertainty.  The price of overcoming this hesitation is a 
switching cost.  One might reassure oneself, for instance, by asking pointed 
                                                          
 138. Louise Kennedy, The Story of Little Black Sambo, BOSTON GLOBE, 2003, available 
at http://www.handprintbooks.com/html_files/BOSTONGLOBEarticle.html. 
 139. Jeffrey Gettleman, An Old Battle Flag Helps Bring Down a Governor, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2002, at B2. 
 140. See Lazos Varga, supra note 106, at 1502 (asserting that the White ethnic 
immigrant belief that hard work, assimilation, and virtue can overcome any adversity that 
dominates the American cultural narrative is hegemonic because it mandates assimilation, 
dismisses the power dynamics of racism, and ultimately pits the White assimilated ethnics 
against the “raced” and the culturally different). 
 141. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 
1734-36 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects the protection of a 
property right in Whiteness). 
 142. See generally RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR (1993) (asserting that past 
scholarship has defined American history too narrowly because it often reflects the scholar’s 
particular perspective of the world and what is needed to create a more complete, more 
accurate picture of history). 
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questions in an extended interview, or taking special care to contact all 
listed references, but these extra steps also represent switching costs. 
One might argue that antidiscrimination legislation, such as Title VII, 
imposes potential costs on employers who do not hire non-White 
applicants, and might thus balance these switching costs.143 Also plausible, 
however, is the claim that the manner in which statutes like Title VII are 
enforced might lead employers to avoid liability altogether by refusing to 
hire non-White employees in ways that avoid successful discrimination 
claims.144  Whether rational or irrational, a careful, motivated employer 
likely will be able to avoid hiring non-Whites. 
B. Skills 
Switching costs can also be represented in the human capital costs of 
retraining, for instance in converting to new accounting or word processing 
programs.  As software program improvements outpace the capacity of 
human beings to learn new systems, most American employers in recent 
years have become aware of how significant these retraining costs can be. 
Every American is aware of the discomfort and awkwardness that can 
take place in unfamiliar racial contexts.  Communicating across racial 
barriers requires new skills.  The acquisition of new skills is a switching 
cost that may not even be recognized as being necessary by many 
employers.  When courts impose diversity training as a remedy, it is often 
considered an attempt to cure employers of unconscious bias.145  It might 
better be considered one of the costs of adopting a new standard in the 
workplace.  A wise employer would anticipate such costs and implement 
training of its own accord, rather than wait for it to be imposed. 
One might, of course, simply encourage non-White employees to learn 
and use Whiteness, as many have learned to do.  Note that the costs of this 
kind of accommodation are borne entirely by the non-White employees.146  
This is the current approach taken by most employers, and the high burnout 
                                                          
 143. See John J. Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1986) 
(arguing that legislation that prohibits employer discrimination enhances rather than impairs 
economic efficiency). 
 144. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 262-63 (asserting that the methods available for avoiding 
the sting of Title VII are numerous, such as purposefully locating a worksite in an area with 
few minorities). 
 145. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context:  Title VII as a Tool for 
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 685 (2003) (discussing cases where court-
approved consent decrees required diversity training, review of human resources practices, 
and monitoring the effectiveness of the decree). 
 146. Cf. ARMOUR, supra note 47, at 13 (defining the “Black Tax” as “the price Black 
people pay in their encounters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black 
stereotypes”). 
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and low retention rates of minorities in many industries are to be expected 
under this analysis.147 
“Diversity training” must educate employees about other racial cultures, 
but the point should not be to teach the details of a foreign culture—as 
though one might then “know” what every Black person thinks and feels.  
Rather, the focus should turn inward, so that White employees can 
understand the ways in which they participate in and support Whiteness.148  
Just as those who learn to speak a language other than English come to 
understand the rules of English better, those who study diversity should 
come to understand their own racial standard better.  One might then better 
understand when one is excluding non-White peers from a network based 
on Whiteness norms. 
C. Coordination Costs 
Note that even if there are few switching costs, there can still be a 
coordination problem.  There may not seem to be much of a network effect 
at work if users of a standard are poorly committed to it and are willing to 
switch to the next standard that comes along.  If the market is one in which 
it is valuable for there to be only one standard, there is nonetheless the 
problem of not wanting to switch unless everyone else does as well, and the 
uncertainty of not knowing if everyone else will. 
The difficulty of coordinating such a switch makes switching less likely.  
For example, a change from the QWERTY keyboard to the supposedly 
superior Dvorak keyboard is difficult not only because of collective 
switching costs, but also because of the difficulty in coordinating the 
switch.149  One wants trained typists, so one must use the system that 
typists are trained in.  Typists want a marketable skill, so they should 
choose to learn the skill that most employers and keyboard makers 
support.150  Unless everyone changes, there is no reason for anyone to 
change, despite the efficiency gains that a new keyboard design might 
offer. Human capital that is compatible with specific a keyboard layout 
gives rise to network effects.151 
                                                          
 147. ARMOUR, supra note 47, at 17; see Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74, at 1762; David 
B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law 
Firms?  An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 564 (describing the attrition of Black 
lawyers at large corporate law firms). 
 148. See Robin D.G. Kelley, The Abolition of Whiteness and Black Freedom, RACE 
TRAITOR (1997), at http://www.postfun.com/racetraitor/features/rkelley.html (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
 149. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 185-86. 
 150. See id. at 186.   
 151. But see LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 39, at 19-39 (arguing that the Dvorak 
keyboard was not in fact a superior standard).  
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Thus, an employer, who was convinced that the work required to 
develop a more racially diverse workforce would be well worth the effort 
because it would produce important business benefits, might be stymied by 
the failure of other firms to reach the same conclusion.152  Firms that 
continued to operate on a de facto Whiteness standard might not appreciate 
the benefits of diversity, and the well-meaning employer could end up 
simply cutting itself out of the network. 
D. Complementary Products 
Goods may increase in value even when not connected to a network of 
like or compatible goods if economies of scale sustain production of 
complementary goods and services.  For example, exotic car repair services 
are viable only where there are sufficient consumers to support them.153  
The positive feedback is that it is worth more to own such a car in an area 
where special services and parts are available.  This occurs only when a 
critical mass154 of others own the same kind of car.  The fact that there are 
so many software applications for Windows enhances its value, and all the 
software is written for Windows because there are so many people who use 
it.155  In contrast, other operating systems are handicapped by the relative 
paucity of programs. 
In the race context, to the extent that consumers of different races 
consume different goods and services, there can be supply-side economies 
of scale in the production of such complementary goods and services.  Thus 
one might observe that in many communities Whites have an easier time 
than non-Whites in finding foods they like to eat, clothes in the sizes, 
colors, and styles that they feel complement their looks or personal style, or 
hair stylists competent to take care of their hair.156  If we view work 
environments as goods offered to the population of workers, Whites will 
have an easier time than non-Whites finding work environments in which 
they feel comfortable.157 
On the production side, people of any race can of course provide goods 
and services that cater to White consumers and thus take advantage of this 
larger market.  However, to the extent that race signals expertise, there may 
                                                          
 152. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Exxon Mobil Corp. at 2, Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 
1043 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
 153. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 494. 
 154. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003). But see Chen, supra note 45, at 
1844-45. 
 155. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 28, at 500-07. 
 156. See STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 225 (citing as an example that 
in Corning, New York, because there were only White barbershops, Corning Inc. recruited a 
Black barber to help make its Black employees feel more at home). 
 157. See id. at 59-60 (explaining that since the majority of employees in America are 
white, blacks have to navigate alone in the work world). 
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be some limit on the ability of minority entrepreneurs to participate in this 
market.  A firm that serves the cultural needs of non-Whites can survive 
when there is a critical mass to support it.  Consider for instance, the 
prevalence of Chinese grocery stores in Chinatown.  But the availability of 
Chinese groceries in many other communities is much more limited. 
Many complementary products are not standard-specific, of course.  For 
example, much of the automotive infrastructure—garages, gas stations, 
driving skills—easily supports both Ford and Toyota vehicles.158  Thus 
while the automobile is a dominant standard for personal transportation, no 
single automaker controls that standard.  Similarly, many services are 
equally compatible with white and non-white people alike.  In contrast, 
early Macintosh users made durable investments in assets that were 
complementary only to a system controlled by Apple.159  Because of the 
hampering effects of switching costs, the producer of a locked-in product 
can extort users.160 
Can White people charge a premium for their services? In a sense, they 
do.  No one else can provide the image, the communications capacity, the 
signaling effects, the customer relations, the network advantages that White 
people can.  This is the flip side of economic analyses suggesting that 
Blacks might offer themselves at lower wages in order to gain entry to the 
market and demonstrate their value.161 
Perhaps more importantly, commitment to Whiteness causes users to 
incur opportunity costs when that commitment conflicts with other values.  
Thus, an individual who might feel some motivation to advance racial 
harmony, or who might otherwise derive some satisfaction or pleasure from 
a racially diverse environment, might give these values up when faced with 
the prospect of forced desegregation or falling home values.162 
One interpretation of a more concrete complementary racial product 
might be represented in the segregated nature of American residential 
neighborhoods,163 schools,164 churches,165 and other social venues.166  Many 
                                                          
 158. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 103. 
 159. Id. at 104. 
 160. See Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs:  An 
Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International 
Trade, 62 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 515, 515-16 (1995) (noting that future exploitation of 
customers gives firms incentive to attract new customers). 
 161. EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 263 (suggesting that less-educated blacks should take 
jobs on an at-will basis and at lower wages to develop the skills they need to move ahead). 
 162. STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 33. 
 163. STEVEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR:  
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 212-22 (2000) (stating 
results of studies conducted to analyze the racial composition of American neighborhoods). 
 164. See STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 42-44 (discussing the millions 
of White and Black students attending racially segregated schools despite efforts around the 
country to desegregate schools). 
 165. Id. at 62-64. 
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Americans pay a lot to go to predominantly-White schools.  They pay more 
to live in neighborhoods where these schools are located and where there 
are few, if any, Blacks.  They will pay more to buy a house if they think 
that they are buying it from a White person rather than a Black person.167 
If this behavior were simply motivated by irrational racism,168 one might 
characterize the behavior as a premium that White racists pay in support of 
their evil intentions.169  However, none of these behaviors are in fact 
penalized in the market.170  A decision to purchase a home in a more 
integrated neighborhood for a lower price does not net the purchaser the 
same quality of life, the same housing appreciation,171 or the same 
educational opportunities.172  The cumulative wealth of Whites who value 
Whiteness in the housing market drives the valuation of the market, as well 
as the provision of such services as law enforcement, education, street 
cleaning, favorable zoning designations, housing code enforcement, street 
repair, and recreational opportunities. 
The appreciation of real estate in White neighborhoods has generated 
immense wealth for many people,173 all of it founded on racial segregation 
and the network benefits of Whiteness.  Giving up Whiteness as a standard 
in residential housing threatens that continuing avenue of disparate wealth 
creation.  The loss of quality of life and future appreciation is therefore a 
switching cost that many residents understandably hesitate to incur. 
E. Complementary Standards 
Sometimes two or more complementary standards can support the 
dominance of the others.174  The dominance of Windows also supports the 
dominance of the particular computer chips manufactured by Intel that 
Windows uses.  Or one might imagine that but for the dominance of 
                                                          
 166. See id. at 64-68 (explaining that Blacks and Whites attend and enjoy different social 
and cultural activities). 
 167. See id. at 29-30. 
 168. See generally id. at 37-39 (discussing the intentional steering away of blacks to 
white neighborhoods by real estate agents); MEYER, supra note 163, at 30-47 (discussing 
that intentional racisim played a large part in maintaining housing segregation). 
 169. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 8 (1957) (explaining that 
those who discriminate must act as if they are willing to forego financial benefits in order to 
avoid certain transactions). 
 170. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 147. 
 171. See id. at 147-51 (comparing the property value appreciation rate in White 
communities as opposed to integrated communities). 
 172. See id. at 150 (stating that blacks are unable to obtain information about better-
quality school systems when they are isolated to inner-city ghettoes). 
 173. See generally id. at 147. 
 174. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis:  Mechanisms of Mutual 
Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 273-74 (2002) (asserting 
that gender status does not exist in “a pure form,” but rather that an individual’s dominant or 
subordinate status is affected by the combination of racial and gender stereotypes). 
LEE.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 1/17/2005  11:21:43 AM 
1290 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1259 
Windows, an internet-only browser and e-mail appliance might have 
gained a greater audience, rather than the personal computer standard on 
which Windows operates. 
Because a strong national antiracism norm has been adopted, any explicit 
reference to Whiteness is now frowned upon. For Whiteness to survive as a 
standard, it must go undercover. Approval and disapproval of individuals 
based on racial standards are now expressed in language that does not refer 
to race directly.  Thus, one might comment on an applicant’s 
professionalism, attitude, values, “classic American” looks,175 or 
communication skills rather than mentioning the applicant is White.  Public 
discourse regarding such issues as crime, welfare, poverty, immigration, 
drug use, or “urban” issues also carries strong racial connotations without 
explicitly mentioning race. 
These complementary standards might serve simply to disguise hidden 
or unconscious racism. But even assuming they do not, to the extent that 
they transmit qualifications that favor White people, they serve to buttress 
Whiteness as a dominant standard. Thus, for example, when a group is 
described as “patriotic,” it invokes both Whiteness (because the historical 
patriot is White) and an impression of national history and identity that is 
founded on Whiteness.176 
Consider two broader examples:  (1) the idea of Western progress and 
civilization originating in Europe; and (2) the parallel theories of 
meritocracy, evolution, and liberal economics.  Given the close correlation 
of Whiteness to European ancestry, the dominant historical narrative of the 
triumph (as opposed to, say, the historical accident,177 the travesty, or the 
merciless conquest178) of Western civilization serves as a powerful 
foundation to justify the historic position of Whites.179  Combine that 
narrative with the theme that it is only fair (merit), natural (evolution), and 
                                                          
 175. See Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & Fitch Bias Case Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2004, at A16 (noting that the settlement of the case included a requirement to add 
diversity to marketing materials); Steven Greenhouse, Clothing Chain Accused of 
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A21 (reporting on the suit filed against 
Abercrombie & Fitch for discriminating against non-Whites in seeking to project a “classic 
American” look). 
 176. See generally Lazos Varga, supra note 106, at 1584-95 (discussing the negative 
stereotypes expressed toward foreigners who are viewed as less patriotic). 
 177. See generally JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL:  THE FATES OF HUMAN 
SOCIETIES (1997) (explaining that the success of Eurasians was a historical accident of 
geography propelled in part by the availability of iron ore deposits and the suitability of 
European terrain for large, domesticated animals). 
 178. See Johnson v. M’Intosh 21 U.S. 543, 544 (1823) (discussing the impact of the rule 
of conquest on the status of Indian land title); see also DIAMOND, supra note 177, at 197 
(stating that Native Americans were victims of murderous Spanish conquistadores). 
 179. See Lazos Varga, supra note 106, at 1522-23 (explaining the White ethnic 
immigrant myth, which connects White ethnics to a heroic story of “the immigrant, who 
arrived poor and was discriminated against, but worked hard and eventually made it”). 
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efficient (economics) for the dominant culture to be left to prevail without 
interference, and one is left with a powerful weave of ideology and theory 
that, without explicitly mentioning race, justifies the modern dominance of 
Whiteness.  Just as the success of Intel chips supports the dominance of 
Windows, adherence to ideals of Western civilization, social evolution, and 
the free market supports Whiteness. 
F. Reputation and Status 
Note that at a seasonal level, many phenomena exhibit increasing 
returns.180  Examples include:  seeing “hit” movies, reading “hot” books, or 
listening to the most popular music so that your appreciation can be shared 
with others who have done the same.  Any item or behavior that comes to 
signify status can have a similar, conformity-inducing effect.181  The 
“Must-see TV” slogan is an attempt to induce this effect by naming it. 
To the extent that the emotional commitment to a product is internalized, 
as with brand loyalty, displacing a dominant standard can be very difficult.  
Brands, of course, also represent a reputational effect.  One hopes to be 
able to rely on the quality and consistency of a familiar brand.182  The 
tremendous information costs of consumers choosing from among a vast 
array of goods is thus dramatically reduced for those who find a brand they 
can trust. The firms that can produce the branded products that earn this 
trust can thus gain superior returns.183 Brand management, the process of 
carefully guiding the image of an identifiable mark, is consequently an 
essential issue. 
One might further develop the ways in which brand management 
resembles the management of racial lines.  My point here is that Whiteness 
might be thought of as a strong brand because it is familiar, has a long 
history of reliability, has connotations of patriotism and wholesome values, 
and is easily distinguished from other products through the familiar 
physical characteristics of its packaging.  TV shows, books, movies, and 
advertising for residential developments, vacation resorts, cars, or clothes 
that feature entirely White models or casts are essentially extending and 
exploiting the racial brand of Whiteness.  The producers of these works 
need not be explicitly or consciously racist:  they are simply seeking a 
particular aesthetic appeal that Whiteness captures.184 
                                                          
 180. See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:  HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN 
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 3-5 (2000) (using the example of Hush Puppies sales that 
unexpectedly rose as a result of a new style that emerged in Manhattan). 
 181. Id. at 12-13. 
 182. See, e.g., DAVID ARNOLD, THE HANDBOOK OF BRAND MANAGEMENT 8-9 (1992) 
(explaining that consumers save time and energy when depending on a certain brand). 
 183. Id. at 3. 
 184. See generally E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 492  
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Cheryl Harris notes that once it was invented, “Whiteness was a form of 
status property,” recognized as a reputational interest in being regarded as 
White.185  Note that it was libelous per se to call a White person Black, as 
an allegation likely to cause injury.  The reverse was not true—“the law 
expressed and reinforced the social hierarchy as it existed.”186 
Some goods operate most importantly as signals of status, “hipness,” or 
patriotism.  Modern advertising that does not picture or even describe the 
product being advertised is all about creating an impression of the kind of 
person who owns the product.  One purchases a product to express and 
demonstrate one’s identity as a rebel, a roamer, or a Romeo.  Note that this 
effect requires that both the seller and the intended audience understand 
what the signal means. 
Racial stereotypes operate this way as well. Because the physical 
characteristics that have come to denote race are so important to visual 
identification in the United States, race is a necessary part of personal 
image.  Shared impressions of racial images are reinforced when one’s 
peers agree that a particular section of town seems dangerous, even when 
there have been no reports of crimes there.  A home for sale that has 
pictures of its African-American owners on display receives offers far 
lower than if the owners are presumed to be White.  The house is, in effect, 
carrying the wrong brand. 
One might try to counter the perceived impression of their race. An 
Asian-American might take pains not to look foreign or nerdy. Blacks 
might be careful never to appear poor or menacing.  In discussions that deal 
with race, White students tend to place special emphasis on their lack of 
any kind of economic advantage or privilege.  This counters the racial 
stereotype applicable to White people:  that they are the beneficiaries of 
racism.  An alternative strategy might be to give up fighting the image and 
instead exploit it. A Black male, tired of fearful stares, might come to act 
boisterously or menacingly and at least gain the small satisfaction of 
inducing fear on his own terms. 
Wherever there is White privilege, such as when traveling on the 
highway, in shopping malls, in interactions with law enforcement, in school 
placement, in neighborhood facilities, or in everyday interactions with 
coworkers, strangers, and friends on the street, in the cafeteria, or in the 
classroom, giving up that privilege will be a cost of switching from 
Whiteness to a different standard. 
                                                          
(2002) (“Values from race markets brand actors in the labor market.”). 
 185. Harris, supra note 141, at 1734-36. 
 186. Id. at 1736; see also DENNIS CHONG, RATIONAL LIVES:  NORMS AND VALUES IN 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 20-24 (2000) (discussing status politics). 
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G. The Trump Card:  Direct Network Benefits to the Employer 
In theory, Whiteness could have become a dominant network standard 
regardless of the racial identity of the employers in a market, just as 
English has become a standard in many countries where English is not the 
native language.  The benefits accrue to employers as a result of the 
network effects among employees. If a mythical African-American-owned 
super-firm bought all of the top 500 corporations, the firm would still 
benefit from adhering to the standard of Whiteness for employees in the 
United States. 
Because of the historical status and advantage of Whites, however, an 
added feedback effect exists that does not exist in the orthodox examples of 
network markets:  the individuals in each firm making and approving the 
hiring decisions are usually White.187  In addition to the firm’s interest in 
having employees that meet the Whiteness standard, each individual White 
actor has a personal economic self-interest in seeing the dominance of 
Whiteness in society and culture maintained. 
Thus any rationalization required for a person in a supervisory position 
to prefer Whiteness while maintaining an antidiscriminatory stance benefits 
not only the firm but the individual himself.  The same applies to the 
producers and developers of mass media who are usually White and whose 
emphasis is on White protagonists.  The triumph of Western civilization 
caters not only to the tastes of White consumers but justifies their status as 
well.  It is as though consumers of computer operating systems were 
themselves personal computers running Windows.  Not only do they 
benefit from the network advantages of adopting the dominant standard 
when they choose Windows, but they advance their own interests by 
choosing a standard in which they themselves are valued. 
III. ESTABLISHING STANDARDS:  PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY TO THE DOMINATION OF WHITENESS 
Network dominance is the product of positive feedback.  One might 
argue that a product or standard has to be well-situated to achieve the 
communication norms and market position required to exploit that positive 
feedback.  In other words, one might expand the definition of merit to 
argue that in fact Windows is a better product than Macintosh because Bill 
Gates had the foresight to distribute his operating system software cheaply 
and freely in order to take advantage of network effects.  Thus, the 
                                                          
 187. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Beyond Observable Prejudice—Moving From 
Recognition of Differences to Feasible Solutions:  A Critique of Ian Ayres’ Pervasive 
Prejudice?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 361, 363 (2002) (asserting that the disproportionately large 
number of white males holding positions of power affecting minorities contributes to 
structural prejudice in the United States). 
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dominance of the network standard might be conceived of as having been 
earned.  Here I describe how market dominance in network markets can 
depend on small, random, historical events rather than any meritorious 
design or foresight.  I briefly allude to the recently burgeoning scholarship 
on the invention of Whiteness to argue that the market dominance of 
Whiteness was established through brute force and legal manipulation 
rather than through any admirable notion of merit. 
A. Contingency on Historical Events 
In network markets, the positive relationship between demand and value 
creates a virtuous cycle.188  Because this positive feedback accelerates the 
market towards the choice of a standard, several economic equilibriums are 
possible.189  That is, regardless of their features or merits, any one of 
several possible alternative standards could emerge as the dominant 
standard, but only one will.  The achievement of actual market dominance 
can be based on small historical events. 
Because of their unique preferences or their high switching costs, some 
consumers prefer to continue to use non-standard products.190  They may, 
however, experience a vicious cycle:  the product loses value as it is 
abandoned by users, eventually stranding those diehards who hang on the 
longest. The initial defectors pay a high cost in changing standards, but if 
the defector is at the leading edge of a virtuous cycle, the defection can 
accelerate into a new norm.  Arguably this has happened with regard to 
overt racism. Whereas the first Whites to embrace nondiscrimination were 
scorned and met with strong formal and informal social sanctions,191 now it 
is David Duke who is the outcast.192  The main point is that if you are in the 
middle of the curve, a very small historical push can determine whether 
your cycle is vicious or virtuous. 
B. The Social and Legal Construction of Whiteness 
In light of the above, if one is to characterize Whiteness as a standard in 
a network market, one might expect to find arbitrary historic events 
                                                          
 188. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 175-79. 
 189. See id. at 181 (explaining the demand side economies). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Cf. Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 352 (1997) (stating that “[a] norm exists as long as the sanctions 
imposed on violators create an expected cost for noncompliance that exceeds the expected 
cost of compliance”); POSNER, supra note 104, at 138-39 (explaining how discriminating 
against deviants among the in-group can serve as a signal to enforce norms). 
 192. David Duke is a former Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Klu Klux Klan and 
actively promotes the cause of “White Rights.”  See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, DAVID 
DUKE:  IN HIS OWN WORDS, (May 2000), available at http://www.adl.org 
/special_reports/duke_own_words/duke_intro.asp. 
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establishing this standard.  Here, the literature on the origins of Whiteness 
is growing rapidly.193 
Many aspects of the history of the establishment of White racial 
domination are widely received.  Hundreds of years of Black slavery 
followed by another 100 years of explicit, legal, public and private race 
segregation and discrimination is certainly enough of an historical push to 
establish a dominant standard.  My point here is that the domination of 
Whiteness is contingent on that specific history.194  Racial standards exhibit 
path dependence.  That is, Whiteness continues to be the dominant racial 
standard simply because it was established as such in the past, rather than 
because of any intrinsic merit. 
It is no longer novel to speak of the social construction of race, except 
perhaps in law and economics.195  Economic analysts sometimes describe 
people as being “Black” or “White” in the same way that a chair or a cat is 
black or white, and the economic puzzle of racism is why anyone would 
presume that a Black person is less attractive, capable, or qualified than a 
White person.196 
It is tempting, given the color-consciousness in which most Americans 
are socialized, to think that Blackness and Whiteness are simply so obvious 
a physical distinction as to be a “natural” basis for racial difference.  There 
are many strongly entrenched group conflicts around the world, however, 
that in form mimic what we call racial divisions, but which take place 
between groups that might appear to us to be “naturally” similar. Consider 
conflicts between equally Semitic Jews and Arabs in the Middle East, 
between equally Slavic Serbians and Croatians in the former Yugoslavia, or 
among castes in India.  The question thus reappears:  how did racial 
Whiteness/Blackness, assigned according to (roughly) European and 
African ancestry, become the locus for status division in America? 
To say that race is socially constructed, is to observe that the category is 
primarily a human invention,197 a social classification, albeit a social 
                                                          
 193. See, e.g., RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS:  THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A 
DIFFERENT COLOR (1998); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS:  RACE AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991). 
 194. Cf. DIAMOND, supra note 177, at 22-23 (arguing that simple geographic features 
conducive to the development of biological immunities, steel, and firearms explain the rise 
of Europe as the dominant world power). 
 195. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 74, at 1763 (explaining that most economic studies of 
race treat it as though it were simply a physical biological characteristic). 
 196. See STEINHORN & DIGGS-BROWN, supra note 108, at 181-83 (describing a racist’s 
perception of blacks). 
 197. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 54-55 (1994) (emphasizing that race is a 
social classification that in turn imposes certain social order and has cultural consequences). 
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classification based on physical characteristics.198  In hindsight, modern 
racial divisions seem so vast that it is hard to imagine that small, random 
events might have altered the development of the strong racial identity that 
Americans experience.  Rather, it seems as though large, inexorable 
historic tides created race in America.199  The idea of the ordinary 
functioning of market forces is so strong that there is a danger of assuming 
that whatever the current state of events, they are the result of the invisible 
hand and the market. Therefore, many assume that Windows is in fact the 
best operating system around, and that Microsoft must be an efficient and 
smart company—look how much money they make!  Yet most of those 
who reach this conclusion have never tried a computer operating on 
Macintosh or Linux.  It is important to separate the current state of affairs 
from the implicit conclusion that they are the result of ordinary market 
forces.  Could things have been different here? 
One might attempt to imagine a world in which different historical 
circumstances prevailed and a different racial standard was established.200  
More to the point, one might imagine a world in which a standard 
developed along lines that we would not today consider racial.  Scholars 
tracing the historical development of the construction of Whiteness note 
that among early colonists in America, racial divisions were neither 
consistently respected nor strictly enforced.201 White indentured servants 
existed alongside free Blacks, and interracial social relations were observed 
to be widespread.202 
Suppose that at this moment in American history, the ideal of height had 
been valued more than it already was.  Blacks might have been separated 
by cultural or educational barriers but greatly respected for their height.  A 
general division of Talls and Shorts might have developed.  These are, of 
course, hereditary characteristics, and one might expect that Talls would 
prefer to marry each other, and produce Tall families, regardless of skin 
color.  Talls might be known for their bravery and industriousness; 
everyone knows, on the other hand, that Shorts are greedy and impatient, 
                                                          
 198. LOPEZ, supra note 19, at 14. 
 199. See JACOBSON, supra note 193, at 2. 
 200. Numerous authors have depicted a future universe in which the Earth is dominated 
by China and Chinese culture.  See generally JOHN HERSEY, WHITE LOTUS (1965); 
MAUREEN F. MCHUGH, CHINA MOUNTAIN ZHANG (1992); DAVID WINGROVE, THE CHUNG 
KUO SERIES (1990); KIM STANLEY ROBINSON, THE YEARS OF RICE AND SALT (2002). 
 201. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North 
America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1742-73 (1996) (describing how Massachusetts’ Body 
of Liberties Code both prohibited and legitimized slavery). 
 202. See Jason A. Gillmer, Suing For Freedom:  Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial 
Identity in the Post Revolutionary and Antebellum South, 82 N.C. L. REV. 535, 550 (2004) 
(citing Ira Berlin, who wrote that for the “first fifty years of English and African settlement 
in the Chesapeake, black and white workers lived and worked together in ways that blurred 
racial lines”). 
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notable exceptions going only to prove the general point.  The occasional 
Tall-looking offspring of a Short couple might produce a warning among 
Talls:  “she looks Tall, but she’s really Short.”203  Or one might speculate 
about scandalous behavior by an indiscrete Tall among the Short couple’s 
ancestors.204  Tall and Short children would come to understand their height 
identity from birth and would both internalize and enforce the social 
meanings that came along with that identity. This would not, of course, be 
a non-racial standard.  Rather, it is an alternate history of race, where race 
revolves around height rather than skin color. 
In reality, the distinction between African and White indentured labor 
grew even as the demand for slave labor increased, resulting in a reliance 
on what became African slave labor.205  The formation of White identity 
was intimately tied to the evolution and expansion of chattel slavery.206  
“The dominant paradigm of social relations, however, was that, although 
not all Africans were slaves, virtually all slaves were not white.”207  
Economic interests dependent on Black slavery had powerful interests in 
stabilizing that system.208  White indentured servitude diluted the clarity of 
a racial polarity aligned along labor status divisions.209 
If there were to be both free individuals and bound labor, and bound 
labor was to be justified in a country founded in part on post-enlightenment 
egalitarian principles, one might imagine a search for a “natural” division 
among workers.  A theory of blended economic and biological 
specialization would be that one or more races might be fit especially for 
bound labor and another race or races might be suited for entrepreneurship 
and management.  Thus one might imagine the circumstances of a free 
Black with White indentured servants in the South during the evolution of 
African chattel slavery.  While initially being merely a statistical anomaly, 
the free Black might soon find his very existence challenged the developing 
identification of Blackness with subjugation and Whiteness with dominant 
status.  Social ostracism would cause difficulty finding business partners 
                                                          
 203. See GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE:  THE TRUE STORY OF A 
WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995) (telling the story of a boy with white 
skin who was raised by Black relatives, and because of this, experienced racism and 
discrimination). 
 204. Cf. WILLIAM PETERS, A CLASS DIVIDED:  THEN AND NOW (1987) (documenting a 
1970 third grade class that underwent a discrimination experiment where the children role-
played after being broken down into blue-eyed people and brown-eyed people). 
 205. See Harris, supra note 141, at 1716-17 (highlighting the development of race-based 
slavery). 
 206. Id.; see also Wiecek, supra note 201, at 1756-57. 
 207. Harris, supra note 141, at 1717. 
 208. ROEDIGER, supra note 193, at 34. 
 209. Wiecek, supra note 201, at 1713. 
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with which to transact.210  In time, the enforcement of powerful social 
norms moves beyond economic notions of boycott and towards violence.211 
Prior to this evolution, however, race was understood more narrowly to 
define groups that we would today characterize as “ethnicities.”  In order to 
comprehend the challenge of understanding why Whiteness emerged as the 
dominant racial standard, imagine that the dominant division instead turned 
out to be Anglo-Saxon v. non Anglo-Saxon races212 or Aryan v. non-Aryan 
races.  In other words, one might imagine that the Irish,213 Italian, and 
Greek “races” came to be considered “Black.” It is no historical accident 
that Whites are the vast majority of workers.  Jews, Catholics, Southern 
Europeans of all nationalities, Irish, Slavs, and other groups now 
considered White214 have all been racially despised and risked outsider 
status in American history.215  Had they remained outsiders, there might 
have been a greater danger that the dominant standard would have failed.  
Imagine a world in which all of these workers came to be characterized as 
“Black.”  Instead, just as Microsoft often purchases and absorbs software 
companies that might have become a threat, Whiteness expanded to include 
these groups.  That they all came to be identified—and to identify 
themselves—as White demonstrates the success of Whiteness in becoming 
the dominant network standard.  There were obvious material benefits to 
the decision of White workers to define themselves according to their 
Whiteness.216  Whiteness helped avoid class conflict because White 
workers could accept their lower class status by forming positive White 
identities in opposition to slavery and Blackness.217  As a result, 
                                                          
 210. See discussion infra Part III.C regarding the enforcement of social norms through 
informal, third-party mechanisms. 
 211. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (describing 
how the current American legal system is a social organization of legal violence). 
 212. See JACOBSON, supra note 193, at 43-44 (noting the emphasis on distinctions 
between Anglo-Saxon and other European races until the issue of slavery arose). 
 213. See, e.g., THEODORE ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994) (tracing the 
transformation of the Irish from downtrodden “Celts” to privileged “Whites”); NOEL 
IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 2-3 (1995) (describing the stigmatization and 
assimilation of Irish immigrants from high-risk, low-wage employment to competitive 
employment and social status). 
 214. See Harris, supra note 141, at 1742-43 (explaining that the “amalgamation of 
various European strains into an American identity was facilitated by an oppositional 
definition of Black as ‘other’”). 
 215. See Juan Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:  The ‘Normal Science’ 
of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1230 (1997) (citing Toni Morrison’s 
example of how acts of racial contempt against Blacks transform immigrants into “entitled 
white[s]”). 
 216. Id. 
 217. IGNATIEV, supra note 213, at 124-41 (describing how Irish immigrants claimed 
Whiteness by attacking blacks). 
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“Whiteness produced—and was reproduced by—the social advantage that 
accompanied it.”218 
To the extent that cultural norms constitute Whiteness, note Jack 
Balkin’s argument that cultural practices evolve through a process that is 
entirely dependent on historical antecedents.219  Building on the work of 
Richard Dawkins, Balkin emphasizes the self-regenerating aspects of 
cultural practices and norms and deemphasizes the individuals in whose 
lives those practices are performed.220  Thus, cultural standards are path 
dependent and sticky in the same way that network standards are. 
C. The Old Boys’ Network 
My claim that Whiteness operates as a network racial standard is not 
merely that White people have an exclusive network, although the two are 
related.  While the “old boys’” network does operate to preserve privileges, 
it is usually imagined differently than a network standard in the sense that I 
mean.  The idea of the old boys’ club is that people with certain biological 
and genetic characteristics—White men—intentionally and perhaps 
covertly reserve economic benefits for other members of the club, 
particularly those who share certain social or class characteristics such as 
school ties, inherited wealth, or shared acquaintances.221  Often these ties 
harken back to local or family history, to periods when Whites “happen” to 
have been formally dominant, both socially and economically. 
There is a sense in this depiction that individuals use the old boys’ 
network intentionally to subvert merit-based selection to benefit the “right” 
kind of people.222  Importantly, then, those who are not intentionally racist 
or who do not share the right kind of exclusive class and social ties can 
claim not to be practitioners or beneficiaries of the old boys’ privilege. 
However, the operation of network standards requires no intentional, 
irrational discrimination, and no special, direct connections.  For example, 
the consumer has only rational benefits in mind when choosing the 
telephone, the English-speaking employee, or Windows.  No malice 
                                                          
 218. Harris, supra note 141, at 1742. 
 219. See JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE:  A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 17 (1998) 
(explaining that “[t]o exist in history means to be the bearer of a particular variety of 
cultural software that has been produced through a process of cultural evolution”).  Balkin 
gives an example of how sixteenth and twentieth century people have different kinds of 
existence because of their different “cultural software.”  Id. 
 220. Id. at 43-72. 
 221. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools:  The Need for 
Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (1986) (discussing the old boys’ network 
in the context of legal academia). 
 222. See, e.g., id. at 435 (pointing out that in the realm of appointing faculty in academia, 
“[t]he fact that the ‘Old Boy Network’ is alive, well, and more often than not the source of 
information most critical to the appointments process is news to none of us”). 
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towards the short-wave radio, the applicant who speaks only Polish, or 
Apple’s Macintosh is required. 
The network effects of Whiteness operate this way—without necessary 
discriminatory intent, and with regard to real economic benefits.  The 
standard of Whiteness is a socially and legally-constructed standard, rather 
than merely an irrelevant biological characteristic.223 
I do not mean to understate the pervasive impact that an old boys’ 
network can have in preserving privilege.  Especially in small 
communities, a particular established social network of acquaintances —
the “pillars” of the community—could so dominate a market that outsiders 
and newcomers are absolutely, or at least significantly, excluded from 
important economic benefits.224  These exclusive networks are often White 
because they are based on historical advantage.  Moreover, the exclusion 
need not be intentionally racist to have a continuing racial impact.  When 
an important local contractor hires the friend of a son, or the son of a 
friend, for a summer job, he is simply doing favors, perhaps for someone 
who looks like him, or who reminds him of himself when he was young.225 
However, because social segregation remains the norm, such casual and 
innocent favors have an unequal racial impact.226   
Nonetheless, these kinds of social networks do not produce the kind of 
economic network effects that are the subject of this Essay.  While the 
dominance of a social clique is path-dependent and race-correlated, it does 
not produce positive returns such that the benefit to each member becomes 
greater the larger the network extends.   
                                                          
 223. Whiteness is, of course, much more than skin color or biology. Neither the Japanese 
Ozawa, who tried to prove how pale his skin was (Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 
(1927)), nor the Indian Thind, scientifically classified as Caucasian (United States v. Thind, 
261 U.S. 204 (1923)), were (or are) deemed White.  See LOPEZ, supra note 19, at 79-92.  
The one-drop rule that rendered those with the tiniest bit of African descent to be Black, and 
therefore subject to slavery, is not a biological rule but a social one.  See Kenneth Payson, 
Check One Box:  Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed Race 
People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1243-49 (1996).  The histories of how Jews and Irish became 
White reveals a social and political, rather than biological, transformation.  Consider the 
ambiguous racial regard that Americans currently have for Arabs, Iraqis, Turks, 
Argentineans, and other groups. See  Jerry Kang, Cyber-race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 
1142 n.35 (2000) (citing Doug Daniels, The White Race is Shrinking:  Perceptions of Race 
in Canada and Some Speculations on the Political Economy of Race Classification, 4 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 353, 354 (1981) (showing results of an informal student survey on 
the race of certain nationalities)). 
 224. See CHONG, supra note 186, at 20 (discussing how status issues show the public 
commitment of society and government to certain groups, cultures, and lifestyles).  
 225. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 147, at 569 (discussing the “bias that potential 
mentors have for protégés who remind them of themselves”). 
 226. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 221, at 435 (giving the example that minority 
students derive fewer benefits from the “old boys’ network” because they are less likely to 
have developed close relationships with the White professors). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Essay has laid out a vision of how Whiteness maintains itself as the 
dominant racial standard in America through network economics.  The 
vision offers rich possibilities for further development.  I note in particular 
three suggestions of topics for further development, and one broader 
agenda: 
Topic 1:  Racial stances and attitudes are analogous to the strategic 
business behavior of those defending or coping with a dominant standard.  
Much of the popular literature on network economics has come from the 
field of business management.227  Having identified the power of networks, 
these analysts offer advice with regard to how a firm might capture these 
benefits by controlling the dominant standard.228  Some of the questions 
that arise relate to the best strategies for sharing a standard to ensure that it 
dominates; how to prevent other standards from being established; or what 
one’s alternatives are when losing a struggle over standards.  It appears as 
though the advice given correlates well with racial strategies adopted by 
both Whites and non-Whites.  In order to maintain the dominance of 
Whiteness, for instance, Whites would be well-advised to ignore the 
existence of non-Whites, to assume that everyone adheres to the default 
standard of Whiteness unless an explicit exception is made,229 and to ignore 
claims of unfair treatment as unmeritorious or just sour grapes.  Non-
Whites facing a market that adheres to a Whiteness standard would be 
well-advised to develop an effective interface with that standard,230 and to 
absorb the costs of making that translation work, or to carve out small 
niche markets within which alternative racial standards might dominate.231 
White Network Economics challenges the foundational economic notion 
of the rational individual.  For Whiteness to be maintained as a network 
standard, Whites—if they are to be taken at their word that they are not 
conscious racists—are not rational because they are acting in ways that are 
directly contrary to their expressed and sincere beliefs in color-blindness.  
Moreover, they are not even entirely individuals, as they are acting in 
concert to maintain racial domination.  These two charges—that Whiteness 
operates as a racial standard despite conscious commitments to color-
                                                          
 227. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 173-225. 
 228. Given the competitive pressure to control standards in network markets, legal 
analysts focus on whether and how competitive behavior in such markets should be 
regulated, or how standard-setting might best be accomplished. See, e.g., Lemley, supra 
note 46, 1059-65. 
 229. FLAGG, supra note 65, at 1-18, 30-38. 
 230. Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 285-87 (noting how firms losing a 
standards battle might try to adapt their product to connect to the larger network). 
 231. Cf. id. at 248 (pointing out that Apple has survived in the wake of Microsoft’s 
success because of its niche strategy). 
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blindness, and that Whiteness operates as a racial standard even in the 
absence of external direction—require further exploration. 
Topic 2:  Behavioral psychology and cognitive dissonance can explain 
how White Network Economics can work in the age of color-blindness.  
The emerging insights of behavioral law and economics232 offer the 
beginnings of an explanation of how it is that individuals apply limited 
available information, overvalue initial allocations, and construct self-
serving rationalizations to justify their conclusions and actions.  While the 
resulting racial disparities are hard to ignore, Whites can thus understand 
them as not resulting from racism.233  In short, it is in the interest of Whites 
both to maintain the dominance of Whiteness and not to understand 
themselves as supporting White domination.  Human beings appear to be 
capable of managing this trick. 
Topic 3:  Social norms can result in the organization of Whiteness 
without hierarchy.  There is, of course, no Bill Gates of Whiteness 
directing the actions of all White people to maintain a dominant market 
position.  However, recent work in law and social norms234 applies 
economic analysis and game theory to produce a theory of how 
sophisticated social cooperation and organization can develop even in the 
absence of a directing intelligent actor.235  Thus, Richard McAdams in 
particular lays out a theory of esteem payments which would support the 
development of intragroup loyalty and intergroup competition along racial 
lines.236  Eric Posner suggests that racial discrimination might arise out of a 
series of signaling conventions.237  Glenn Loury has written about the 
socio-mechanisms that produce racial stigma of African-Americans.238  
Together, these theories suggest that Whiteness is perfectly capable of 
maintaining itself without there being any leader.239 
                                                          
 232. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (explaining that the purpose of this approach is to look at the 
affect on the law of actual human behavior, which includes “bounded rationality, bounded 
willpower and bounded self-interest”). 
 233. See ARMOUR, supra note 47, at 12-13; Lawrence, supra note 47, at 374-76 (citing 
polls that found that most Whites do not blame racism and discrimination as the major 
causes of inequality between Blacks and Whites). 
 234. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); POSNER, supra note 104. 
 235. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); DENNIS 
CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991). 
 236. See McAdams, supra note 191, at 355, 356-75 (arguing that “norms arise because 
people seek the esteem of others”). 
 237. See POSNER, supra note 104, at 133-40 (suggesting that “discrimination against 
people with salient and immutable characteristics that systematically differ from those of 
desired cooperative partners serves as a signal to the latter that one has a low discount 
rate”). 
 238. See LOURY, supra note 88, at 61-65 (giving an example of racial profiling and 
explaining that this act perpetuates false beliefs and prohibits learning). 
 239. See BALKIN, supra note 219, at x (pointing out that “[a]dvocates of social 
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Topic 4:  A broader agenda:  Whiteness and other natural complex 
systems.  Current racial orthodoxy puts forth the autonomous individual as 
the principal unit of analysis and characterizes race as an irrelevant 
biological characteristic.  Absent racist intent on the part of individuals, 
disparate racial effects magically disappear from view.  Network 
economics alters this perspective by pointing out the effect that systems can 
have on individual incentives and actions.240  But network economics is not 
the only new field of study in which the phenomenon is playing out.  
Biologists and computer scientists are studying swarm intelligence to see 
how simple insects can produce sophisticated group behavior.241  Richard 
Dawkins posits that genetic characteristics might be thought to propagate 
themselves, regardless of the intent or motive of the organisms that carry 
the characteristics.242  Carrying over this insight into cultural evolution, one 
sees a system in which individuals are not cultural actors but vessels for 
cultural continuity.  Leaf formation, city formation,243 cellular automata,244  
and certain random numbers are seen to produce similar patterns, not 
through divine guidance or intelligent supervision, but because of the 
universal nature of pattern formation.  In the right circumstances, a market 
can reach a “tipping point,” and the actions of thousands of independent 
market actors can produce coordination and unison so perfect as to 
resemble a conspiracy245 or a choir.  The study of the complexity and 
coordination that simple actors can produce by following simple 
instructions is everywhere it seems.  The time has come to apply these 
insights to the problem of race.  The general point is the same:  individuals 
acting without malice can nonetheless produce a complex and oppressive 
racial scheme in the same way that ants can build cities,246 cells can 
                                                          
construction have been looking in the wrong place” and need to look “deeper inside” 
individuals). 
 240. Cf. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 117, at 10 (“When you are selling one 
component of a system, you can’t compete if you’re not compatible with the rest of the 
system.”). 
 241. See, e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE:  THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, 
CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 18 (2001); Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution:  
The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 137 (discussing evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and his Biomorph 
Land computer program). 
 242. See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1990); see also Geu, supra 
note 241; BALKIN, supra note 219, at 43 (describing how Dawkins’ “memes” “spread from 
person to person by observation and social learning . . . [through which] people internalize 
and assimilate skills, beliefs, attitudes and values”). 
 243. JOHNSON, supra note 241, at 33. 
 244. STEVEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 1-16(2002). 
 245. See Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils:  Antiblack Conspiracy 
Theorizing & the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1995) (discussing 
the antiblack conspiracy theory “dealing with the wholesale destruction of urban black 
communities by means of drugs and guns”). 
 246. See JOHNSON, supra note 241, at 29-33 (pointing out that ants conjure up colonies 
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produce trees, and people can produce trends, fashions,247 and social 
movements.248 
To make progress on race, a new vocabulary must be developed that is 
both critical of institutions and structures that maintain the racial 
domination of Whiteness, yet is accessible and understandable to ordinary 
well-meaning people who identify themselves as White.249  White Network 
Economics is only one example of analysis that describes, not oppressors 
or supremacists, but ordinary people making ordinary economic decisions 
not based on malice or intentional racism and not even conscious of the 
racial nature of their behavior, but nonetheless contributing to the 
perpetuation of the dominance of Whiteness. 
 
                                                          
without a leader the same way that collective human behavior builds cities). 
 247. See GLADWELL, supra note 180, at 3-9, 139 (giving as an example the rise of Hush 
Puppies as a fashion trend as a result of contagious human behavior). 
 248. CHONG, supra note 186, at 1 (discussing “public-spirited collective action” as large 
scale activism based on concerns such as peace, women’s issues, the environment, civil 
rights and other moral issues). 
 249. The language of oppression and White supremacy may certainly be accurate and 
achieve empowerment and awareness on the part of non-Whites.  This is not an insignificant 
or unimportant task.  Indeed, my own dedication to racial progress has been nourished and 
encouraged by various sophisticated analyses of race inequality.  However this language is 
not designed to accomplish the kind of access that is necessary to bring about broader 
change. 
